Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 17.pdf/275

 THE GREEN BAG partment, the court in the case of Woolworth v. Star Co., 90 New York Supplement, 147, holds that a newspaper article is libelous per se which consisted of an article devoted to an account of the plaintiff and his business, and to his great success in establishing the latter and evolving interests of great magnitude from very small be ginnings, after which it goes on to refer to his complete absorption in the pursuit of moneymaking, and concludes as follows: "A sensation was created recently by the announcement made by Mrs. W. that her life had been made unhappy because her husband neglected everything, herself included, in his absorbing pursuit of millions. . . . Mrs. W. and her husband are now separated, which she ascribes is due to the incompatibility of the artistic and money-making temperaments." The court states that the parts of the article quoted above indicate that upon the declaration of the plaintiff's own wife, he is so base and sordid that he neglected everything, herself included, in his absorbing pursuit of money. One of the meanest of all vices is the mere love of money, and when a man is accused of being affected by that vice so far as to lose sight of the duty he owes to his wife or to his family, he is made at once contemptible. The contention is sustained, therefore', that the article complained of holds the plaintiff up to public contempt and scorn and to shame. MARRIED WOMEN. (SEPARATE ESTATE — LIABILITY FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES) GEORGIA SUPREME COURT. The unique question was raised in the case of Kenyon v. Brightwell, 49 Southeastern Reporter, 124, as to whether the husband or the adminis trator of the deceased wife was liable for the funeral expenses. The administrator in this in stance took the position that the estate of a mar ried woman who dies, leaving a husband surviv ing her, is not liable for her funeral expenses. Under the common law, of course, the husband is bound to bury his deceased wife in a manner suitable to his station in life. The court gives an interesting summary of the husband's rights and duties at this time, from which it appears that it has been held that the husband has supreme au thority to direct where the wife shall be buried, that it is his duty to care for her grave, that in selecting a place for burial he may act regardless of the wishes of her family, and even that he may remove a gravestone placed at the wife's grave by her family and substitute another more in keeping with his taste. Passing, then, to the question before the court, it is pointed out that the Georgia code provides that the debts of a

decedent shall rank in priority in the following order: first, year's support for the family; second, funeral expenses to correspond with the circum stances of the deceased in life, including the physician's bill, expenses of the last sickness, etc. The husband contended that under this section the common law rule as to the husband's duty had been abrogated in Georgia, and that the estate of every decedent was liable for the pay ment of funeral expenses. The court states, how ever, that this contention is not sound. To the extent that the statute is in derogation of the common law it must, of course, be strictly con strued. It merely provides for the priority to be observed in the payment of debts due by the estate. Unless especially made so by statute, it is the opinion of the court that the funeral ex penses of a married woman who leaves a hus band surviving her are not a debt of her estate, and quoting from the case of Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala. 97, 25 Am. Rep. 598, it is stated that statutes creating separate estates of married women, while they deprive the husband of rights which would otherwise accrue and could have been asserted at common law, do not absolve him from the duties which the common law imposes. An examination clearly shows that this decision is in accordance with the weight of authority. In those states where the contrary doctrine has been announced, it appears that the rulings were based upon special statutes. ORIGINAL PACKAGE DOCTRINE. (!OWA CIGARETTE CASES — INTERSTATE COMMERCE) UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. The court again applies the original package doctrine in the cases of Cook v. County of Mar shall, 25 Supreme Court Reporter, 233, and Hodge v. Muscatine County, 25 Supreme Court Reporter, 237. These cases affirm the prior case of Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343. 45 L. Ed. 244, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132, and the facts are similar, except that in the Austin case the packages of cigarettes were thrown loosely into baskets in which they were shipped to the retailer, while in the present case they were simply dumped loose into the car. As the court held in the first case that the baskets might be considered as the original package, the contention was made in the present case that each of the small boxes holding ten cigarettes each should be considered as the original package. The original package doctrine was first laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, where it was said: "It is sufficient for the present to say generally that when the importer so acted upon the thing im ported that it became incorporated and mixed up