Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 17.pdf/271

 THE GREEN BAG majority opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and the Supreme Court squarely up holds the doctrine laid down in the dissenting opinion of Judge Thayer upon the first and third points. In support of the holding that a loco motive is a car, the court cites with approval Winkler v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 4 Penn. (Del.) 387, 53 Atl. 90; Fleming v. Southern R. Co., 31 N. C. 476, 42 S. E. 905; East St. Louis Connecting R. Co. v. O'Hara, 150 Ill. 580, 37 N. E. 917; Kansas City M. & B. R. Co. v. Crocker, 95 Ala. 412, ii South. 262; Thomas v. Georgia R. & Banking Co., 38 Ga. 222; New York v. Third Ave. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 404, 22 N. E. 735; Benson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 75 Minn. 163, 77 N. W. 798, 74 Am. St. Rep. 444. The opinions of the Circuit Court of Appeals are found in 117 Fed. 462. AUTOMOBILES. (DEFINITION OF DRIVING) MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT. A park regulation to the effect that no person shall ride or drive at a rate of speed exceeding eight miles an hour is held by the Massachusetts Court in Commonweatlh v. Crownin shield, 72 Northeastern Reporter, 963, to be sufficiently defi nite to support a criminal prosecution for operat ing an automobile at an excessive rate of speed on the ground that the person who is controlling the motive power of the machine must be said to be "driving" it. CARRIERS. (PERSON ACCOMPANYING PASSEN GER ON BOARD TRAIN — MEASURE OF CARE REQUIRED OF CARRIER) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APP. Div., 20 DEPT. That so common a practice as seeing one's friends safely aboard a train should not have been more fruitful of litigation is one of the first ideas that suggests itself upon consideration of the facts involved in Dunne v. New York N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 91 New York Supplement 145. Plaintiff in that case had gone aboard the train with a friend and was injured by the starting of the train as he was about to dismount. It is held that under these circumstances no such re lation as that of passenger and carrier existed between plaintiff and defendant and that the only obligation of the railroad was to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring plaintiff from the time he entered the train until he left it. There is no obligation upon a railroad to hold its train until every person not a passenger leaves the same, and this is true irrespective of the duration of the stop made at the station. It appeared in the case under consideration that the servants of the defendant saw plaintiff walking down the aisle

of the car towards the platform, but the court decides that this did not require them to forbear from giving the signal that the train could proproceed inasmuch as walking in the aisle of the car or even going out on the platform are com mon practices of passengers who have no inten tion of leaving the train, and even though it be at a standstill in the station, the obligation of defendant's servants to refrain from starting the train came into existence only after they had re ceived or should in the exercise of due care have received actual notice of the intention of plaintiff to leave the car. It is also concluded that the mere fact that the plaintiff had descended on to the step of the car before the train was set in motion was not sufficient to render the conduct of defendant's servants in starting the train neg ligent. Plaintiff also sought to recover on the ground that defendant had no brakeman sta tioned at the foot of the steps to hold the train until persons not passengers should alight there from, but it is concluded by the court that defend ant was not required, as a matter of law, to have persons so stationed when the intention of plain tiff to leave the car was signified only by his act of alighting. It is however held that if it was the custom of defendant railroad to station a brakeman at the foot of the steps who was to signal the train to proceed only after all persons, including those in the act of alighting, had reached the ground in safety, plaintiff had the right if he knew of such custom to rely on its observ ance, but if he did not know it, he took the con sequences of his act in alighting from the car. CONTRACTS. (LABOR UNIONS — INTERFER ENCE WITH FREEDOM OF EMPLOYMENT) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APP. Div., 20 DEPT. The power of labor unions to maintain control of the employer's business, and dictate what per sons he may employ, and the conditions under which he may employ them, is given a seriotis setback in Jacobs v. Cohen, 90 New York Supple ment 854. There a contract between an em ployer and a labor union, providing that the employer should not employ any help other than those who were members of the union, conform ing to its rules, and providing that the employer should cease to employ persons not in good stand ing, on being notified of that fact, and that the employer should abide by the rules of the union, is void as against public policy, because attempt ing to restrict the freedom of employment. The court cites and quotes at length from Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297, in support of this holding, and also maintains that the Curran case was not overruled by the later case of Nat.