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 EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT be cut or worked at the belligerent end under censorship; the war correspondent, by uni versal usage, is only allowed tp accompany an army subject to strict regulations. The wire less news-gatherer, combining the dangerous qualities of all three, should not be permitted at all." MASTER AND SERVANT (Independent Contractor) THE elaborate treatise on the "Liability of an Employer for the Torts of an Independent Contractor," by C. B. Labatt, is continued in the Canada Law Review for February (V. xli, P- 49)NEGLIGENCE (Theory of) THE March Canada Law Journal (V. xli, p. 233) contains a thoughtful analysis of "The Psychology of Negligence" by Charles Morse, of which he says that "it must be admitted that there is a regrettable amount of confusion in the books as to whether the element of in tention on the part of the wrong-doer has aught or nothing to do with the theory of liability." He contends that in many of the cases the element of intention does not manifest itself in relation to the result of the breach of duty, but is confined wholly to the breach itself, •which may or may not be followed by an in jurious result; and it is only the result which makes the conduct of the wrong-doer a subject of juridical enquiry. He further criti cises the theory of some writers that negli gence is a form of mens rea. He traces the history of the maxim from the canonists and submits that it "had a special place and mean ing in the criminal law; and, that being so, any unnecessary dislodgment of it therefrom for the purpose of making it do duty as a part of the technics of another and distinct branch of legal science is to be deprecated under any circumstances, but where the new setting for the old maxim is incongruous and subversive of its original meaning, such a use, or rather abuse, ought not to be allowed to become general." Civil wrongs in English law are of three classes, each having a different theory of re sponsibility. (i) Personal wrongs, in which intent is an element.

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(2) Wrongs to property, in which liability is imposed for the technical violation of a legal right without contemplating its cause or effect. (3) Wrongs arising through negligence, in which a standard of conduct is the test of the wrongful character of the act done. " If there can be said to be any subjective side to the legal doctrine of negligence, it consists in a purely passive state of mind on the part of the wrong-doer toward the consequences of his carelessness, such a state of mind as nega tives the presumption of intention to produce the injury suffered." From an examination of the authorities the author concludes that, "in formulating its the ory of liability for negligence in civil cases, the law has not regarded the mental attitude of the wrong-doer, but has contented itself with fixing an external standard of conduct as the criterion of blameworthiness. To attempt to overlay this purely objective theory with subjective refinements is not such an experiment as could be expected to commend itself either to hard-headed practitioners or to the more academic members of the legal profession who are jealous to keep intact such symmetry as the philosophy of the common law has up to the present time been able to achieve."

PROCEDURE (Law's Delay) "Individualism and Legal Procedure," is the title of a brief but suggestive article by Walter Storrs Clark in the March Yale Law Journal (V. xiv, p. 263), which treats of the old but ever-pressing problem of the "law's de lay." This is the constant and grievous com plaint of the layman who ceases his criticism only in the belief that remedy is hopeless and that the wickedness of lawyers conspires for selfish interests to prevent reform. It is our hope to present in our next issue a discussion of this subject by a number of eminent judges and practitioners from all parts of the country, and it is with especial interest, therefore, that we read that : "Of the political 'whips of time* which Hamlet enumerated, three centuries ago, he would, if he should visit America to-day, miss two — the oppressor's wrong and the insolence of office; but he would still recog