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THE GREEN BAG

view (V. iii, p. 364). He submits that the right to vote involves the right to nominate, and that "any law which denies to the voter the right to determine for whom he shall vote must be void." On the other hand, our "whole system recognizes that voters will act in groups, and while parties are not expressly provided for, the fact that the majorities are to control clearly presupposes the division of the people into groups or parties. Concerted action and assembly to consult naturally give rise to parties." If such an existence is to be maintained, the right of membership must be voluntary and controlled by the party. They are, however, subject to police regulations like individuals. Thus we regulate nominations. For the purpose of printing the official ballot, parties may be classified on any reasonable basis, such as voting strength, but this must not abridge the voter's right to vote for others. Participation in a caucus is essentially a parti san affair, and the voter is not entitled to secrecy, nor is anyone entitled to nominate except a member of the party. Decisions are not agreed as to what tests, if any, of party membership may be applied by the state. A convenient reference list of the different state primary laws is appended. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Statutes. Public Officers)

ALONZO H. TUTTLE concludes in the March Michigan Law Review (V. iii, p. 341) his article on "Removal of Public Officers from Office for Cause," begun in the previous number. He sums up the law as follows: "i. The courts differ as to whether power 4 to remove' grants an arbitrary power, but the weight of authority is to the effect that it does. "2. Courts differ as to whether power to remove 'for cause' or for cause specified, is a grant of an arbitrary power of removal, but the weight of authority and the better reason ing is to the effect that it is not. Those courts that hold that it is not, differ as to whether the power is executive or judicial. Those holding that the power is executive but not arbitrary, differ as to the extent of the limi tation — some, like Wisconsin, holding that notice and hearing are not necessary but filing of charges is, while courts like those of Ne

braska, Ohio, Utah, hold that charges, notice and hearing are necessary. "3. With no exception it is held to be con stitutional to confer upon local administrative officers the power to remove for cause. Courts differ as to their reasons for so holding, some declaring that the power exercised is exec utive, not judicial, while others hold that the power is judicial in nature, but not in the sense used in the constitution when it speaks of 'judicial power.' It is believed the latter position is the correct one. "4. With the exception of Michigan (over ruled in later decisions) it is held to be consti tutional to impose this power upon the gov ernor. Most courts justify it on the ground that the power is executive, not judicial, while others justify it on the ground that though judicial in nature it does not violate the prin ciple of the separation of powers. This is be lieved to be the true position. "5. The weight of authority and sound reasoning is to the effect that certiorari will issue to review proceedings of local adminis trative officers in removing for cause. "6. Courts differ as to what will be re viewed on a comrrton law writ of certiorari. Some holding that the record only is brought up and the question of jurisdiction determined, while others hold that the evidence will be ex amined to see if errors of law affecting the party have been made or if the evidence be such as to warrant the decision. "7. On principle certiorari should issue to the governor to review his removals for cause. Such an act of removal is judicial in nature whether exercised by local executive officers or by the governor." CONTRACTS (Action by Beneficiary) THE article entitled "Limitations of the Action of Assumpsit as Affecting the Right of Action of the Beneficiary," by Crawford D. Hening, is continued in the February Ameri can Law Register (V. liii, p. 112). In the De cember issue he presented a number of ancient cases of debt and of account in which a bene ficiary not a party to the transaction was allowed to recover upon the obligation. In this number he concludes the discussion of the cases of debt and continues as to account, concluding as follows: