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question of agency the court cites Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260, 20 Sup. Ct. 611, 44 L. Ed. 762; Murphy v. Independent Order of the Sons and Daughters of Jacob of America (Miss.), 27 South. 624, 50 L. R. A. in; and Bragaw v. Supreme Lodge K. and L. of Honor (N. C.), 37 S. E. 905, 54 L. R. A. 602. While not referred to by the court, the case of Jumper v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 127 Fed. 635, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, is opposed to the decision as an nounced by the South Carolina Court.

LUNACY. (CONTRACT MADE DURING SANE IN TERVAL.) INDIANA SUPREME COURT. In the case of Chase v. Chase, reported in 71 Northeastern Reporter, at page 485, the question was raised as to whether attorneys, who had been retained by the alleged lunatic before proceedings were instituted for the express purpose of pro tecting his estate in case lunacy proceedings were brought, had any authority to prosecute an ap peal from these proceedings after their client had been adjudged insane. Under the Indiana stat utes it is provided that the interests of the alleged lunatic are to be looked after by the prosecuting attorney, and in the present case, it is shown that the attorney represented the alleged lunatic in the lunacy proceedings. There was no doubt but what the agreement with the attorneys was made at a time when the person who had been adjudged a lunatic was perfectly sane and rational. The court holds that the question comes clearly within the general rule of principal and agent. It is stated that while it is yet an unsettled question whether the intervening insanity of a principal operates per se as a revocation of the agency against third persons who have, without knowl edge of such insanity and before an inquest, dealt with the agent on the assumption that the prior authority still existed, yet it seems that no au thority is to be found which sanctions as between the principal and the agent the right of the latter to act where he has full knowledge of the princi pal's insanity. In support of the doctrine that the subsequent insanity of the principal termi nates the agency, the court cites from the leading text-book writers on this subject. The theory of this doctrine is that the derivative authority can not continue beyond the time when the principal might himself lawfully act in the premises. The court also cites with approval the case of Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H. 156, where it is held that the authority of the agent does not exist during the nsanity of his principal, for the reason that an

agent's acts derive their validity from the pre sumed continued assent of the principal, a hy pothesis that cannot be indulged while he is in sane. It is pointed out that a fundamental ob jection to the agreement under discussion is, that it seeks to provide in advance for an extra judicial guardianship, whereas the law has made its own provisions for the care and custody of insane per sons and their estates. The very fact that an attorney is an officer of the court furnishes a special reason why it should not be competent for him to bargain for a diminishment of the powers of such tribunal. It is further pointed out that the proposed agreement was intended to provide for circumstances which afterward existed, when the client was too insane to request counsel to defend him, or to exercise any act of authority over the litigation. Under these circumstances the agreement was contrary to public policy, for it is incompetent for an attorney to make an agreement authorizing him at his discretion and without let or hindrance from any one to carry out a defense to the limits provided by law.

JOINT TORT FEASORS.

(CONCURRENT ACTS.)

CIRCUIT COURT, So. DIST. OHIO. The general haziness which in some jurisdictions has enveloped the question as to what relation must exist between the wrongful acts of different persons in order to constitute them as joint tort feasors, severally and collectively liable for re sulting damage, is somewhat clarified by the opinion of Thompson, J., in Graves v. City and Suburban Telegraph Association, 132 Federal Re porter, 387. The petition in that case showed that a pole of the telegraph company had iron spikes driven into it at intervals to serve as steps; that a traction company had lines of trolley and feed wires carried on iron poles on the same street near to the telegraph company's lines and wires; that one of the feed wires of the traction company through the negligence of the two companies was allowed to remain in contact with one of the iron spikes where by reason of insufficient insulation the metal of the feed wire came in contact with the metal of the spike; that the guy wire of the traction company extended from one of its iron poles past and touching the wooden pole of the telegraph company to certain braces and stays connected with the trolley wires of the traction company; that through the negligence of the trac tion company the guy wire was not provided with a circuit breaker between the iron pole and the wooden pole to prevent currents from passing