Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 17.pdf/201

 i86

THE GREEN BAG

and authorizes, among other things, an acquittal on sworn denial of the facts charged as a contempt, but provides that nothing therein contained shall be construed as affecting proceedings against any party for contempt for the enforcement of civil rights and remedies. This statute, it is held, has no application to contempt proceedings in chan cery brought for the violation of injunctive pro cess against the court, and as the statute so con strued does not attempt to interfere with the power of the court in the enforcement of its own decrees it is observed in the opinion that it is not necessary to refer to the inherent powers of the courts to enforce their decrees and command re spect for their processes. As indicating its opin ion, however* that such power must exist so long as the judicial department is recognized as a sep arate branch of our governmental system, the court adds that the existence of such powers is essential to the maintenance of our system of government and that no legislature can abridge, limit, or take away such power either directly or indirectly by attempting to define the offense, or undertaking to regulate the procedure. The case arose from violation by striking employes of the Forging Company of an injunction restraining them from interfering with, hindering, obstruct ing or stopping any of the business of the Com pany or its servants. The pickets employed by the labor union and who had actual knowledge of the injunction were held guilty of contempt in violating it although they were not made de fendants in the suit for the injunction.

sition at once. She was afterwards summarily discharged, without notice and without cause. The court holds that a contract to give an em ployee permanent employment for as long as the employee shall desire to retain such employment and the services of said employee are satisfactory is not one such as the law will enforce unless the employee fixes the period of his services at the time he presents himself for work, citing the cases of Railway v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 10 S. W. 99, 13 Am. St. Rep. 758, and also Railway v. Smith, 81 S. W. 22. The plaintiff attempted to claim that the expression used in the letter "we wish you to understand that we are not trying to get you down here just to keep you here until the season is over and then let you out," fixed the period of employment at not less than one season, and that in accepting she accepted the offer for at least one season, and entered the employment with this understanding; but the court ruled against this construction on the authority of the Scott case above referred to. It has been held in other states that a contract to give one steady and permanent employment is enforcible, and in the case of Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N. E. 802, 51 Am. St. Rep. 289, it was held that under an agreement to furnish the plaintiff with steady and permanent employ ment the duty was imposed upon the master of employing the plaintiff as long as the latter was able, ready and willing to perform such services as it may have had for him to perform, and hence was not void for uncertainty.

CONTRACT. (EMPLOYMENT FOR INDEFINITE TERM — RIGHT TO TERMINATE.) TEXAS COURT OP CIVIL APPEALS. The contract before the court in the case of Hickey v. Kiam, 83 Southwestern Reporter, 716, was one made and accepted by correspondence. It appears that the defendant wrote that he had an opening in one of his departments for a good forewoman, and that if the plaintiff thought she was capable of holding such a position, she would be started upon a certain salary, and if her ser vices were satisfactory she could have the position as long as she wished to keep it. It was further stated that the position was permanent, and that the chances for advancement were good. The defendant further wrote: "We wish you to un derstand that we are not trying to get you down here just to keep you here until the season is over and then let you out. We want you to be a fixture with us in this town, and you will have a good and satisfactory position with us as long as you wish to keep it." The offer was accepted by telegraph, and the plaintiff entered upon the po

CORPORATIONS. (RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDER TO SUE ON BEHALF OF CORPORATION —-AdVERSE INTERESTS OF DIRECTORS.) ALABAMA SUPREME COURT. The right of a holder of corporate stock to sue in his own name to enforce the rights of the cor poration, which are prejudiced by the adverse interests of the directors, is reasserted in a some what amplified form in Montgomery Traction Co. v. Harmon, 37 Southern Reporter, 371. It was there alleged that the Traction Company had entered into a contract with J. G. White & Co., which gave the latter corporation an undue and inequitable advantage, and, in effect, consti tuted a transfer of the property of the Traction Company to White & Co. without consideration. It was further alleged that a majority of the directors of the Traction Company were employees of White & Co. Under these circumstances, it is held that a contention that a stockholder could not maintain suit without first making demand upon the directors to do so is without founda tion, and that a stockholder may bring suit in