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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES interest which concerns no one else. While this is theoretically true, the principle, if carried into actual and general practice, would result in many evils. For many of those coming within the class denominated as employes, work is a compelling and insistent necessity which cannot long be postponed without distress. If it came about that one of these releases was the ordinary inci dent of employment, it would be demanded and accepted as any other usual condition. The more ignorant and the more unskilled the laborer, and therefore the more needing protection, the more readily would he yield easy submission to such an exaction. It is held that the question presented must be decided upon the theory that the court is not adjudicating for this particular plaintiff and defendant, but for all who may de sire to take advantage of the principle which shall finally be established upon this question, and that the effect of sustaining the present release would "be to say to employers as a class, they may pro cure from their employes contracts which will absolve the former from all obligations to reason able care and prudence, and subject the latter to all the risks and dangers which will follow from indifference and carelessness. Such a policy, if adopted and resulting in increased dangers and injuries to the lives and health of a great mass of citizens, could not but be the cause of wide-spread harm and a matter of general concern. These considerations lead to the conclusion that the re lease should be held void as opposed to public policy. NEGLIGENCE. (Docs — DEGREE OF CARE RE QUIRED.) NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT. For the first time in the history of the state the Supreme Court of North Carolina was called upon, in the case of Moore v. Charlotte Electric Ry., Light & Power Co., 48 Southeastern Reporter, 822, to consider a civil action brought by the owner of a dog to recover damages for its killing by a rail road company. The statutes of the state make it prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of a railroad company, in an action for damages against the company, whenever it appears that any cattle or live stock are killed by the engine or cars running upon the railroad. As the dog can not be included in the category of cattle or live stock, the court notes that the company cannot be charged with negligence without proof. Con trary to the decisions in some of the states, how ever, it is held that the dog is a species or subject of property recognized as such by law, and for an injury to which an action at law may be sustained, citing the case of State v. Latham. 35 N. C. 33. The question to be disposed of, then, is one in

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volving the degree of care which must be exer cised by the agents of the company in cases where dogs are found on or near the tracks. After cit ing cases dealing with this question as applied to mules and horses, the court cites from the case of Jones v. Bond, 40 Fed. 281, where this tribute was paid to the intelligence of the dog: " I presume the reason that other cases of like kind have not been before the courts is that the dog is very sagacious and watchful against hazards, and possesses greater ability to avert injury than almost any other animal; in other words, takes better care of himself against impending dangers than any other. He can mount an embankment or escape from dangerous places where a horse or cow would be altogether helpless; hence the same care to avoid injuries to an intelligent dog on a railroad is not required of those operating the trains that is required in regard to other animals. The pre sumption is that such a dog has the instinct and ability to get out of the way of danger, and will do so, unless its freedom of action is interfered with by other circumstances at the time and place." The North Carolina court then says that the dog, on account of his superior intelligence and possession of the other traits above men tioned, in respect to the diligence and care which locomotive engineers owe to their masters and to them, must be placed upon the same footing with that of a man walking upon or near a railroad track, apparently in possession of all his faculties, and that the engineer would be warranted in act ing upon the belief that the dog would be aware of the approaching danger and would get out of the way in time to avoid the injury. As the en gineer would be negligent if he ran over or injured or killed a man upon the track who was appar ently helpless, so he would be if he killed or in jured a dog under the same circumstances, or if he was totally oblivious to his surroundings. In this latter connection the court refers to the case of Citizens' Rapid Transit Co. v. Dew, 100 Tenn. 317, 45 S. W. 790, where the court allowed a re covery because it appeared that the dog which was killed was standing upon the track engaged in pointing some birds, which fact the motorman saw for a considerable distance before the car ran over the dog. NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPALITY. (GOV ERNMENTAL CAPACITY AND CORPORATE CA PACITY.) APPELLATE COURT OF INDIANA. A nice distinction as to the liability of a muni cipal corporation for alleged negligent acts is made in the case of Aschoff v. City of Evansville, 72 Northeastern Reporter 279. Action was brought