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 Rh facts, when those facts are placed before it by persons unskilled in rules of procedure and unable to estimate the relevancy or irre levancy of evidence. The Police Court af fords an excellent illustration. There the partios delight to worry through the lifehistory of their opponents for hours to gether without approaching within reason able distance of the matter in controversy. Another glaring fallacy that apparently nothing will eradicate is the idea that Un employment of counsel tends to prevent a reasonable settlement of the dispute. It is probably the experience of every counsel at the Bar, and it is assuredly notorious to the Bench that in almost every case the client is responsible for refusing a fair offer of settle ment. So far from the fact being that coun sel is generally engaged in urging on the unwilling litigant, in the majority of cases it is the litigant himself with a firm belief in his own case, who, in spite of counsel's ad vice, insists on going on to his own destruc tion. "CONTINGENT Fees" are upheld by the Central Lau1 Journal in these words : The only serious objection to the contin gent fee is the fact that it makes the advo cate a party to the litigation: it gives him a direct pecuniary interest in the result; so that instead of assuming a disinterested at titude, the advocate is compelled to inject his own personality, which, from the stand point of the highest ideals of advocacy, is always to be avoided. Nevertheless, the exception to the general rule in this particu lar case is dictated by so many considera tions of expediency and public policy that the exception to the rule may now be said to be as firmly established as the rule itself. . . . The final argument in favor of the contin gent fee is that the public favors contracts for compensation on that basis. Where claims are uncertain, or where the parties plaintiff are in poor circumstances, the re quest is nearly always made by the client that the advocate undertake to prosecute the case on a contingent fee. Coming from the client at no solicitation from the advo

cate it can be hardly said that any advant age has been taken of the client's necessities or that the advocate has sought to obtain a personal interest in the litigation. The pro fession cannot set itself against the almost universal demand of the public, without in curring the latter's ill-will and loss of pat ronage, as the public always has a way of getting what it wants sooner or later, and it would be far preferable, in our opinion, if the public were assured that the best and most reputable members of the profession would, in cases of necessity, enter into ar rangements for contingent compensation, rather than to consign this class of litiga tion wholly to shysters and "ambulance chasers." CONCERNING "The Clergyman's Duty Un der the Law," the Chicago Laiv Journal says: While the statutes of most of the States are permissive in character, in which the privilege is given to certain public officers, ministers of the gospel, and others, to per form the marriage ceremony, and while the words "may solemnize" usually appear in the preface of the code giving them the right to perform the marriage ceremony, it appears to us, that whenever the ministers of any denomination accept the benefits of the statute, they accept it cum oncrc, in other words, that the burdens attendant upon the granting of so great a privilege are those which church canons cannot de stroy, for the law fixes the qualifications es sential to and required of those proposing to enter into the marriage contract, and hen the law says that a certain man and a certain woman may marry, it appears to us, that it is beyond the power of any church to forbid its ministers to perform the service, provided the proper license from the proper authority is presented, and the other legal formalities complied with. . . . We believe that the permissive words of the several statutes where they say "may" are imperative words, and mean "shall." If so, while it would be impossible to oblige the minister of the gospel to perform the religious ceremony, he cannot lawfully re fuse to perform the legal service which