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absolutely follows in all cases. Thus it has been held that the property of a non-resi dent within the State, while strictly subject to garnishment, as for instance in the case of a common carrier receiving goods consigned for transit to a place outside of the State, is not amenable to such process. Stevenot v. Eastern Minnesota Ry., 61 Minnesota 104, 63 Northwestern Reporter 356, 28 Lawyers' Reports Annotated 600; Baldwin v. Great Northern Railway Co., 81 Minnesota 247, 83 Northwestern Reporter 986, 61 Lawyers' Reports Annotated 640, 83 American State Reports 370. The cases cited the court re gards as indicating that it should not give to the Minnesota statute providing for the ac quirement of jurisdiction by attachment such interpretation as would, in order to secure jurisdiction, overcome by artifice the mere presence of property in the State, which has practically been enforced, under exceptional circumstances that require its presence tem porarily to meet the necessities of com merce. Having this limitation in view, the court notes that under the laws of the State of Minnesota common carriers doing busi ness therein are required to transfer through carload shipments to their destination with out unloading, and that the Federal govern ment expressly requires that the movement of railway cars shall not be stopped or de layed at the point where the carrier delivers the cars to the next connecting carrier, but that shipments shall go forward from the originating point to their destination in the cars in which they are first loaded. "These well-known provisions of law are expressive of a universal condition that exists upon all the railway lines of this country, and without giving them effect and permitting the rail way carriers from other States to come into our boundaries with goods which are shipped here, and return without being retarded, or so treated that the carriers must protect themselves against litigation away from home, that they would transfer the contents

of such cars to others in our State would be provocative of the greatest detriment to the business interest of our citizens, and be violative of the terms and- spirit of the enact ments to which we have referred. It follows that we cannot justify a construction of our attachment or garnishee statutes that would effectuate such a result, and, while it was a part of the contract between the non-resi dent corporation in this State and the con necting carriers that the freight cars should be re-loaded, and within reasonable time re turned, this custom was but a practical method of securing compensation for bring ing the car into and out of the State in the necessary effort for continuous and unbroken transit, which is essential to the purposes of traffic and interstate commerce; hence it should not be treated as property subject to attachment. This subject has been thor oughly and exhaustively considered in two recent cases, and the reasoning therein with in the lines above suggested meets our ap proval. M. C. R.R. Co. v. C. & M. L. S. R.R. Co., i Ill. App. 399-404; Wall v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Go. (W. Va.) 44 Southeastern Reporter 294. Had the car seized in this case been delayed longer than was necessary in the course of business to return it to the place from whence it came, or had it been di verted within the State to uses and purposes exceptional to its presence here under the demands of interstate commerce with the consent of the owning corporation, a differ ent proposition would be presented: but practically it was engaged in a transit into and from the State upon such reasonable conditions as ought not to impose upon it such property conditions and characteristics as should subject it to seizure in coming into and returning from the State for the purposes of giving jurisdiction to litigants here who otherwise would be compelled to contest their causes of action in the tribunals where the property had its undoubted legal situs."