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and meaning of the act of 1891." The court further calls attention to the fact that the immigration laws of the United States were put in force and effect in Porto Rico by section 14 of the act of April 12, 1900, and hence do not operate externally and adverse ly to the citizens of Porto Rico. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. (INTERSTATE COM MERCE — POWER OF STATE то TAX BAR ON VESSKL.) SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE.

In Harrell г: Speed, 81 Southwestern Re porter 840, plaintiff contended that a vessel belonging to a corporation of Arkansas and plying between a port in Arkansas and one in Tennessee was not subject to the license tax imposed by the laws of Tennesee for running a bar while the vessel was at its landing within the jurisdiction of Tennessee. It is admitted that the Legislature of Ten nessee cannot impose a privilege tax on the corporation for disembarking its passengers and discharging its cargoes of freight at the wharf in the city of Memphis, or for gather ing passengers to be transported across the river to the state of Arkansas. This exemp tion rests on the fact that receiving and land ing passengers and freight are incident to their transportation. Therefore, a tax on this privilege would be a burden on inter state commerce, and unenforcible. But the court is of the opinion that the same thing cannot be said as to a privilege license re quired for maintaining a bar for the sale of spirituous liquors on a boat. The court cites a long list of cases wherein is affirmed the general proposition that the regulation of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is peculiarly within the control of the States, and within their police power, which has not been surrendered to the fed eral government, and holds that the imposi tion of a license on a vessel maintaining a bar for the sale of liquors while moored at a landing within the State is not an infringe ment of the right of interstate commerce, especially in view of the provisions of the Wilson Bill. By this holding the court dif

fers from the view taken by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Frappart, 34 La. Ann. 140. PARTY WALLS. (AGREEMENT BY OWNERS то BUILD — RIGHT OF VENDEE то ASSUME THAT WALL is PAID FOR.) SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI.

In Mayer v. Martin, 35 Southern Reporter 218, the question arose as to whether or not the vendee of a lot on which a party wall has been erected may assume that his ven dor has paid his share for the erection of the wall. The court in the first place says that it is the law that the contract by a lot owner to pay half the value of a party wall when erected does not run with the land. Furthermore, it is settled by Keils v. Heim, 56 Miss. 700, that the purchaser of a lot find ing a party wall thereon has the right to as sume that any compensation as between his vendor and the owner of the adjacent lot has been paid. PERSONAL INJURIES. (LIABILITY FOR AGGRA VATION OF EXISTING AILMENT.) KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS.

Basham •:: Hammond Packing Co., 81 Southwestern Reporter 1227, was an action by an employe to recover damages for in juries caused by the fall of an elevator in vhich he was riding. It was claimed that plaintiff was at the time of his injury suf fering from certain ailments, and that a per son in sound health would not have suffered any effects from the accident. Therefore, it was contended that plaintiff was not entitled to recover any damages. The court calls at tention to the fact that a carrier is liable for injuries to an invalid passenger, though it be probable that the passenger would have sustained no injuries had he been in robust health. On this point the court cites Mathew v. Railway Co., 78 S. W. 272: Owings v. Railway Co.. 195 Mo. 182, 8 S. W. 353, 6 Am. St. Rep. 39: Brown v. Railway Co., 66 Mo. 588: Fleming 7-. Railway Co., 89 Mo. App. 140; Allison 7r. Railway Co., 42 Iowa 274: Purcell 7'. Railway Co.. 48 Minn. 139, 50 N. V. 1034, 16 L. R. A. 203. This being