Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 16.pdf/686

 Nofes of Recent Cases. probor & Icgaliitm hominum de visnetii illo neutri parti suspecter, diligente? inquires quae damna praedictits Bernardas habiiit occasione transgressionis pr(¡edictac. Et quant citiits dictas Petrus eidein P. satisfcccrit de damno illius juxta ta.vaiionein eorundcm juratorum, praedicto averia eidfm Petra sine dilatione liberan facias juxta eundcm valorem &• precium cnjits fnentnt tempere quo fuerunt eidem Barnardo retórnala. Et qualitcr, etc. Et habeas, etc." DOCKED HORSE. (CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STAT UTE PROHIBITING USE OF UNREGISTERED DOCKED HORSE.) SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO.

In Bland v. People, 76 Pacific Reporter 359. it was contended that Laws Col., 1899, p. I75, c- 93' prohibiting the use oí unregistered docked horses was in derogation of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, providing- that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, and Const, art. 2, ^3, providing that all persons have natural, es sential and inalienable rights, among which is the right of possessing and protecting property. It was further contended that the statute in question was an unreasonable ex ercise of the police power. This statute pro hibited the docking of horses and provided fon the registration of horses that were docked at the time the statute went into ef fect but prohibited the use of unregistered docked horses. The court says that the docking of a horse's tail is cruelty, not only because of the torture inflicted by the opera tion, but because by depriving the horse of the use of the tail he is deprived of the use of a weapon supplied him by nature for his protection from the myriads of winged pests that infest the land. Numerous authorities are cited to the effect: (i) That it is within the police power of the state to prohibit cruelty to animals, because such prohibition is a protection to the animals and tends to conserve the public morals; (2) That in the exercise of the power the Legislature may adopt such reasonable means as are neces sary to accomplish the purposes of the

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statute; (3) That to the Legislature is con fided a large discretion in declaring the pub lic policy, and that, unless the legislation is clearly and palpably in violation of the funda mental law, it will be sustained; (4) That all property is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be in jurious to the public. The court then says that these propositions, being established by abundant authority, it remains to be deter mined whether the means adopted by the Legislature for the purpose of preventing the species of cruelty forbidden by the statute can be regarded as a reasonable exerise of the power confided to the Legislature. As it provided for the registration of horses docked at the time the statute went into ef fect, the court considered it reasonable to prohibit the use of unregistered docked horses. The character of the offense prohib ited by the statute is such that something more than the mere prohibition of the dock ing was necessary to accomplish the purposes of the act, and the means .employed by the Legislature are probably the most efficient that could be devised to prevent the docking. "The whole scheme and purpose of the act would probably fail if the use of the docked animal were not prohibited, and as the act is clearly intended to conserve the public mor als and to protect the horses, and as. the means employed by the Legislature to effect ively prevent the cruelty prohibited by he statute are reasonable and consistent with the policy of the state as declared by the act, and are measures necessary for the protec tion of the interests of the public, it becomes our duty to uphold the statute." EMINENT DOMAIN. (ExERCisE^pFfRiciir— ELEC TRIC RAILROAD THROUGH RURAL DISTRICT— DEFLECTION FROM HIGHWAY.)

SUPRKME COURT OF ILLINOIS. Hartshorn r. Illinois Valley Traction Co., 71 Northeastern Reporter 612, was a pro ceeding by an electric railroad incorporated under the general laws of Illinois of 1872 (Laws 1871-2, p. 625) to condemn private property for a right of way. As the con templated road was in the main to deflect