Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 16.pdf/625

 572

it is held that an action of ejectment for possession of the property by one of the cotenants inures to the benefits of all the cotenants. In such cases only the possession of the property is involved, but where the title to the common property is in question. the co-tenants cannot take advantage of a judgment in favor of one of them.

WAGES. (PAYMENTS REDEEMABLE IN MERCHAN DISE — CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES — FREEIIOM OF CONTRACT — POLICE POWER.) SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

State v. Missouri Tie & Timber Co., 80 Southwestern Reporter, 933, was a prosecu tion for issuing orders and evidences of in debtedness not redeemable at their face value in lawful money of the United States. Rev. St. Mo. 1899, Section 8142, prohibits any person, firm or corporation, from issu ing, in payment of wages, any order not negotiable and redeemable at its face value in lawful money of the United States. Sec tion 8143 requires all persons issuing such orders during business hours to be ready to redeem them in lawful money, and section 8144 provides that a violation of the preced ing section shall constitute a misdemeanor and render the party violating the same lia ble to fine or imprisonment or both. A con viction was had under the above statute, and on appeal it was contended by defendant that the statutes were unconstitutional, be cause they invaded the constitutional right to contract. The court cites State r. Loomis. ITS Mo. 307. 22 S. W. 3^0. 2i L. R. A. 789, wherein Rev. St. Mo. 1889, section 7058 and 7060, which made it a misdemeanor for any corporation, person or firm, engaged in manufacturing or mining, to issue, in pay ment of waees, orders payable otherwise than in lawful monev of the United States.

unless the same were negotiable and re deemable at their face value in cash or in goods or supplies at the option of the holder, were held unconstitutional on the ground that they were not "due process of law" within the meaning of the Constitution, and on the further grounds that they were an interference with the right to make reason able and proper contracts in conducting legi timate business. Though the statutes in volved in this case are not, like the statutes involved in the Loomis case, open to the objection that they are class legislation, yet the court is of the opinion that they are un constitutional on the ground that they in vade the right to contract. The state, how ever, contended that the statutes should be upheld on the ground that they were law ful police regulations by virtue of the state's police power. But to this contention the court replied that it was of the opinion that, under the great weight of authority, the act in question could not be upheld, in so far as defendant and its adult emploves were con cerned, for it could not be said that the de fendant, in operating a tie and timber busi ness, was in any way pursuing a public bu>iness, or devoting their propertv to a public use. The right to labor or emp'.oy labor and make contracts with respect thereto upon such terms as may be agreed upon is both ч libertv and a propertv right, and is included in the guaranty of the Constitution, which provides "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The court further says tint though the right to contract mav be subiect to limitations growing out of duties which the individual owes to society, such limita tions must be upon some reasonable basis, and not arbitrarv. In support of this thecotirt cites Ritchie r. People. 155 Ill. 98. 40 N. E. 454, 29 L. P. A. 79. 46 Am. St. Rep. 315.