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to require the production of these contracts would be to compel witnesses to furnish evidence against themselves which might re sult in forfeiture of estate, in violation ot the fifth amendment to the Constitution, and would subject the parties to unreasonable searches and seizure of their papers, con trary to the fourth amendment. The court, hosvever, says, that as to the objection based on the fifth amendment to the Constitution. the Interstate Commerce Act. as amended Feb. ii, 1893 (28 Stat. at L. 443. c. 83, U. S. Сотр. Stat. 1901, p. 3173). expressly extends immunity from prosecution or for feiture of estate because of testimony giver, in pursuance of the requirements of the law. Therefore, the court did not consider that objection as tenable. As to the objection based on the fourth amendment to the Con stitution, the court cites Boyd v. U. S. in. U. S. 616, 26 L. Ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524, wherein Justice Bradley pointed out the analogy between the fourth and fifth amend ments, and the object of both to protect a citizen from compulsory testimony against himself, which might result in his punish ment or the forfeiture of his estate or the seizure of his papers by force or their com pulsory production by process for a like pur pose. With this analog}' of the fourth and fifth amendments in mind, the court came to the conclusion that as the statute protected witnesses from such use of the testimony given as would result in their punishment for crime or the forfeiture of their estates, testi mony given under such circumstances pre sented scarcely a suggestion of an unreason able search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.

justify a recovery for libel, though there might also be a lawful motive for the publi cation. It was also held that the fact that a communication forming the basis of an action for libel was conditionally privileged, did not shift the burden of proving its falsity to the plaintiff.

MASONIC REGALIA. (BANKRUPTCY — EXEMPTION OF REGALIA AS WEARING APPAREL.) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF VERMONT.

In re Everleth, 129 Federal Reporter, 620, was a proceeding in bankruptcy. The bank rupt had, among other things, masonic re galia, consisting of a hat, belt and sword. which he claimed to be exempt as wearing apparel. The court says that a question as to articles similar to the masonic regalia was before the supreme court of Vermont in Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Yt. 249. It was there held that a sword and belt of an intestate, worn by him when in uniform as a purser in the United States Navy, were not a part of his wearing apparel, and did not pass as such to the widow, but that the epaulets, with the coat on which they were, should go as wearing apparel to the widow. That ques tion as to the meaning of the words "wear ing apparel" on decreeing distribution be tween the widow, the heirs and creditors, the court considers similar to the one involved in this case as to the meaning of the «ame words in setting off property between the bankrupt and his creditors. The court therefore came to the conclusion that the belt and sword were not exempt as wearing apparel, but that the hat was exempt, as it was understood to be such a hat as when worn would answer all the purposes of a hat.

LIHEL. (PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS — MALICE — BURDEN OF PROOF.) SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS.

In Cranfill v. Hayden, 80 Southwestern Reporter, 609, it was held that a showing of any degree of actual malice in the motives inspiring the publication of a conditionally privileged communication was sufficient to

MASTER AND SERVANT. (FELLOW SERVANT RULE.) UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dickson, 24 Su preme Court Reporter, 683. involved the