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matter in hand than would be the case if his individuality were sunk in the verdict by a majority. This is probably quite true. If the juror knows that unless he consents to agree with the others there can be no ver dict, it is very likely that he will be careful in trying to make up his mind according to the evidence and render a just verdict. The. inducement for him to do this is all the great er since in case he is the only one who will not agree to the verdict the other eleven wish to render, he must take the responsibil ity for the entire decision. Not many men care to go before the world with this re sponsibility unless they are fully persuaded that they are justified in holding to their opinion. Without carefully considering the hole matter they will not feel justified in taking this responsibility. Under a rule by which the majority decides, it is clear that the individual juror would not be likely to give the case so much attention. We are all aware of the comfortable feeling that comes over us as soon as we know that some other person will vote as we do. Our minds are at once relieved from the exertion of finding more arguments in support of our position. On the contrary when standing alone in our opinion, we feel the amount of energy we must spend in finding evidence to convince others that we are in the right. This is pre cisely what happens in the jury room. While the trial is going on each juror feels the necessity of paying close attention lest he be the one that will have the others against him and thus be compelled to produce the reasons for his position. It seems quite clear that the unit rule in this way tends to emphasize the individual juror's responsibility. The principal argument against the aboli tion of the unit rule is that it is not a matter of very much importance. This is the lead ing argument that was made in the New York constitutional convention of 1894, where the question was discussed somewhat, though not at very great length. It is said

that not many disagreements of juries are such that they would be prevented by the adoption of the unit rule. When a jury dis agrees the vote usually stands either six to six, seven to five, eight to four, or nine ta three. The cases are not many when one or two men hang the jury. Again it has been shown that out of the whole number of jury trials the disagree ments of the jury are comparatively few. Of 1104 jury cases tried in the superior court of the City of New York, there were but 35 dis agreements. The Supreme Court in the first department of the State of New York, which includes the city, tried from 1889 to 1893, 3,460 jury cases. Of these there were but 22 in which the jury disagreed. It seems as though there is a mistake in the number of disagreements it is so small. Yet these are the figures given by the clerk of that court. and presented by Mr. Truax to the consti tutional convention. From these figures it is clear that the question of the abolition of the unit rule is not as important as it might seem from reading the arguments that have been presented in its favor. It should still further be added that these cases are not civil cases alone; the number includes the criminal cases as well. It is true that the disagreements of the jury are much more common in cases where a person is charged with crime than in civil cases where the action of the jury is not such as to de prive anyone of life or liberty. This is why jurors decide the cases submitted to them very quickly when nothing but the question of property is concerned. It is not in the cases that are concerned with the determina tion of line fence troubles that the jurors are kept out all night in the jury room. Only cases that are concerned with the lives and liberties of persons are sufficient to do that. Such being the case, it is clear that the abolition of the unit rule will not tend great ly to diminish the number of disagreements in civil cases. This proves that there are