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 Notes of Recent Cases. ishable. Adultery is said to be a public of fence, notwithstanding the requirement of the Iowa Code that the prosecution can only be instituted on the complaint of the injured husband or wife. The court distinguishes this case from Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226, and Miles v. State, 58 Ala. 390, in which the agreement of a married woman to have intercourse with a man other than her husband was held not to amount to a con spiracy to commit adultery because the con sent involved was a part of the offence itself. The court says that one may aid and abet in adultery without actually participating in the act and it can discover no ground for saying that a combination to commit the unlawful act, which is not an agreement between the immediate parties to the intended crime, may not constitute a conspiracy. But the defendant in this case escaped punishment on a most peculiar ground. While he, himself, was aware that the female with whom he contemplated intercourse was a married woman, his co-conspirators were not apprised of that fact and hence contem plated nothing more than fornication, which is not a criminal offence in Iowa. On this account the court held there was no con spiracy. It says, "While these parties .mav be presumed to have intended the natural consequences of their acts this does not in volve knowledge concerning the status of this woman. Without such knowledge it is not perceived how they could have conspired with defendant to have committed this par ticular crime. ... In the absence of any evidence of knowledge on the part of either of the co-defendants the accused should have been acquitted." FELLOW SERVANT RULE. (STATUTE OF SISTER STATE— WHAT LAW GOVERNS.)

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS.

In Williams r. Chicago. Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 79 Southwestern Reporter 1167, it is held that the Iowa Code of 1873. section 1307, abrogating the fellow-servant rule as applied to railroad employés, while governing a right of action in Missouri for negligent injury inflicted in Iowa, must be

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applied, not as construed by the Supreme Court of Iowa, but as construed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. The reason seems to be that under the Missouri Con stitution the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State are binding on the Court of Appeals. FRAUD. (LIMITATIONS — PROCURING DEED — RE CORDING— NOTICE то GRANTOR.) IOWA SUPREME COURT.

In MacDonald r. Bayard Savings Bank. 98 Northwestern Reporter 1025, the court holds that the recording of a deed, attacked by the grantors therein as having been pro cured from them by fraud, is sufficient 'to start limitations running on the cause of action. How the grantee's act of tendering the deed for record and its entry in the offi cial records could apprise the grantors of any facts not known before to them, or arouse any suspicion or provoke any inquin which they did not already entertain or pur pose, is not discussed. Two Iowa cases, Bishop v. Knowles, 53 Iowa 268, 5 North western Reporter 139, and Gebhard r. Sat tler, 40 Iowa 152, are cited, but in both the facts were radically different. In each of these it was held that the grantor of a deed of trust was charged with notice of fraud in the trustee's sale by the recording of • the deed given by the trustee to the purchaser. In such a holding there is some show of reason, but the extention of the doctrine now made seems to be a judicial inadver tence. HOMICIDE. (EFFECT ON Jus Mariti—FORFEITURE OF ESTATE—BILLS OF ATTAINDER—CONSTITU TIONAL PROVISIONS—ESCHEAT.) TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT.

In Box v. Lanier, 79 Southwestern Re porter 1042, a controversy arose between the personal representatives oi a wife and those of her husband over the proceeds of an in surance policy upon the husband's life. The policy had been made payable to the wife if she survived, otherwise to the husband's per sonal representatives. The husband deliv ered the policy to the wife with the statement