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Therefore, if it is an open question, the opinion of Judge Holmes, and of the judges who agreed with him, that there had been no violation of the Statute, seems the better. . Perhaps the position of Judge Brewer is the most significant feature of the Merger Case. He was with the majority of the Court in the Traffic Association Cases, and to the correctness of the result in those cases he adheres. He would, therefore, it is presumed, still hold that a contract limiting competition in interstate commerce, al though neither a common law contract in restraint of trade nor a monopoly, might be within the Statute; but now, apparently shocked by the possible result of a doctrine which might send to prison two expressmen who had formed a partnership to carry be tween two towns in adjoining States, or the brakemen on an interstate railroad who had struck for an eight-hour day, he energetically declares that, in contradiction to what was said in the Traffic Association Cases, an agreement, in order to violate the Statute, must be in unreasonable restraint of trade. Now that Judge Brewer has, in so marked a manner, repudiated the doctrine which was the ground of the opinions in the Traffic Cases, where he was with the majority, and that Judge Peckham, who delivered these opinions, is one of the minority in the Mer ger Case, the Traffic Association Cases must be considered, to speak familiarly, as having received a black eye, or rather two black eyes. The Statute is still capable of being abused, but from the worst abuses the Su preme Court, as at present, constituted, will protect the community, and we can join in Judge Holmes' expression of satisfaction that only a minority of the Court adopt an interpretation of the statute which ''would make eternal the bcllinn omnium inter oinncs and disintegrate society as far as it could into individual atoms." "THE Panama Situation in the Light of In ternational Law" is the subject of an ex haustive article by William Cullen Dennis in

the American Law Register for May. The Panama controversy arises under the thirtyfifth article of the treaty of 1846 between New Granada and the United States, this treaty being "in full force between the United States and Columbia" when the re cent revolution took place. To quote from the paper before us: Three substantive propositions seem to be laid down in the thirty-fifth article, viz.: ist. Xew Granada guarantees to the United States the free and open transit of the Isthmus by all present and future means of transportation. 2d. The United States guarantee to New Granada the neutrality of the Isthmus to the end that the free transit may not be inter rupted. 3d. The United States guarantee the sov ereignty and property which New Granada has over the Isthmus. After a detailed consideration of the puz zling questions which have arisen under ar ticle thirty-five the writer says in conclusion: Summarizing the results of our investiga tions as to the proper construction of the thirty-fifth article of the treaty of 1846. it is submitted that they establish the following propositions: ist. The guarantee of the sovereignty and property of Xew Granada over the isthmus of Panama does not -bind the United States to defend this sovereignty against domestic insurrection even if the revolution should re sult in the independence of Panama. 2d. The United States do guarantee the sovereignty and property of New- Granada over Panama as against foreign powers, European or American. 3d. New Granada guarantees to the United States and their citizens the right of free transit over the Isthmus. This imposes upon New Granada the primary duty to maintain this freedom of transit. 4th. The United States guarantee the neu trality of the Isthmus in order that free tran sit may not be interrupted. This guarantee is effective against any interruption of the transit whether proceeding from domestic