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care with respect to him after he began his efforts to sustain the wall. As to whether there was any negligence of the employer toward himself, the court says: "Undoubted ly Parsons owed the moral duty of protect ing his own person from harm. But the love of life is regarded as a sufficient inducement to self-preservation; all that is deemed es sential for the government of persons in matters affecting themselves alone. Where no one else is concerned, the individual may incur dangers and risks as he may choose, and in doing so he violates no legal duty. He cannot be guilty legally, though he may be morally, of neglecting himself. ... It may be said, however, that Parsons ought, in placing himself in peril, to have anticipated that some one would, upon discovering his danger, undertake to shield him from harm. But this was a contingency which, as it seems to us, would not be likely to be con templated. Men do not expose their lives to danger with the idea that others will pro tect them from harm by risking their own lives. Though history teems with accounts of heroic conduct and self-sacrifice, deeds of this kind have not become so common that they are to be anticipated as likely to occur whenever opportunity is afforded. The in stincts of self-preservation still so dominate human conduct that acts like that under con sideration, in which life itself was risked for the protection of another, are of such rare occurrence as always to commend the special attention and admiration of the entire com munity, and by the common voice of man kind those who do them are singled out as worthy of enrollment on the scroll of heroes. Because of their infrequency, however, it cannot be said that they should enter into the calculations of men as at all likely in the ordi nary transactions of life. As they spring from magnanimity, magnanimity must be relied upon in cases like this for reparation." MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. (Аст OF OFFICER — PROSECI-TION UNDF.R VOID ORDINANCE—LIA BILITY OF MUNICIPALITY.) WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT.

In Simpson v. City of Whatcom, 74 Paci-

fie Reporter 577, the question was whether a city was liable for damages for prosecu tions conducted by its officers for the viola tion of a void ordinance requiring a license fee to be paid into its treasury, for the use of bicycles on its streets. The ordinance was enacted in conformity with Laws 1899, p. 41, authorizing cities to regulate and license the riding of bicycles. The court says that the question has never been presented to it, and an exhaustive examination of the au thorities discloses that they are bewildering, both in numbers and lack of harmony. The two cases particularly discussed are McGraw v. Marion, 98 Ky. 673, 34 S. W. Rep. 18, 47 L. R. A. 593, and Taylor v. Owensboro, 98 Ky. 271, 32 S. W. Rep. 948, 57 Am. St. Rep. 361, the doctrine of the latter case— that a municipal corporation is not liable for the acts of its officers in enforcing a penal ordinance or while engaged in duties relat ing- to the public safety and in the mainten ance of public order being the one finally followed. As the ordinance in question was enacted under legislative authority, the city is regarded as a governmental agency, not withstanding the license fee went into its treasury, and its officers acted as agents of the State or general public. Other cases are: Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171, 50 Am. Rep. 289, Lawson v Seattle, 6 Wash. 184, 33 Рас. 347, Worley v. Columbia. 88 Mo. 106, Nisbet г: Atlanta, 97 Ga. 650, 25 S. E. 173, Bartlett r. Columbus, 101. Ga. 300, 28 S. E. 509, 44 L. R. A. 795, McFadin v. San Antonio, 22 Tex. Citv App. 140, 54 S. W. 48, Caldwell v. Prunelle, 57 Kan. 511, 46 Рас. 949- Buttrick v. Lowell, i Allen, 172, 79 Am. Dec. 721, Trescott v. Waterloo (C. С.) 2б Fed. 592, and Town of Laurel v. Blue (Ind.) 27 N. E. 301. MUNICIPAL OFFICES. (INCURRING INDEBTED NESS — EXCESS OV-ЕД CONSTITUTIONAL .LIMITA TION—PERSONAL LIABILITY.) IOWA SUPREME COURT.

Lough v. City of Esterville, 98 North western Reporter 308, was an action brought by taxpayers of the defendant city against it and its officers to enforce against the latter