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they were the subsequent device of other minds, there is no infringement of his copy right. The court says: "No doubt, the good faith of such mimicry is an essential element; and, if it appeared that the imitation was a mere attempt to evade the owner's copy right, the singer would properly be pro hibited from doing in a roundabout way what could not be done directly. But where, as here, it is clearly established that the imi tation is in good faith, and that the repeti tion of the chorus is an incident that is due solely to the fact that the stage business and the characteristics imitated are inseparably connected with the particular words and music, I do not believe that the performance is forbidden." CRIMINAL SENTENCE. (MODIFICATION OF SU PREME COURT—EXERCISE OF PARDONDING POWER —CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE.)

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT. In Palmer v State, 97 Northwestern Report er, 235. the provision of the Nebraska Crim inal Code, Sec. 5903, empowering the su preme court to reduce an excessive sen tence, and pronounce such sentence as in its opinion is warranted by the evidence, is held not to violate the constitutional provision forbidding the judiciary to exercise any power properly belonging to the executive branch of the government. Palmer was sen tenced to seven.years' imprisonment for the larceny of a stray steer, worth $20, and the court says the sentence is excessive, and almost Draconian. The validity of the statute was denied in Barney v. State, 49 Neb. 525, 68 Northwestern Reporter, 636, and in Fanton v. State, 50 Neb. 354, 69 Northwestern Reporter 953, 36 L. R. A. 158, but "after much reflection," the court declares these decisions unsound. The fol lowing authorities are relied on as sustain ing its position: Fager v. State, 22 Neb. 332, 35 Northwestern Reporter, 195; Ander son v. State, 26 Neb. 387, 41 Northwestern Reporter, 951; Charles v. State, 27 Neb. 881, 44 Northwestern Reporter 39; and Nelson v. State, 33 Neb. 528, 50 Northwestern Re porter 679.

DETECTIVES. (DISORDERLY CONDUCT— SHADOW ING-—RIGHT OF PRIVACY.)

NEW YOKK SUPREMF. COURT. In People v. St. Clair, 86 New York Sup plement, 77 defendant was convicted of dis orderly conduct in violating Penal Code, Sec. 675, as amended by Laws 1891, p. 657, ch. 327, providing that any person who, by any offensive or disorderly act, or language, shall annoy or interfere with any person in any place, or with the passengers of any public stage, railroad car, or other public conveyance, shall be .guilty of a misde meanor. Defendant was a private detective, and was properly licensed as such. He was engaged in shadowing the complaining wit ness, and for several days had followed him closely from place to place along public streets, making inquiries about him, and at tracting attention to him. The court first holds that the term "public place" is not lim ited by the places subsequently mentioned in the act, but covers any public place. The fact that defendant was licensed did not re lieve him from the punishment prescribed. The fact that there is no right of privacy at common law does not render the statute void as beyond the power of the Legisla ture to enact. It is finally declared that de fendant's conduct amounted to a violation of the law. Judge McLaughlin dissents. No cases are cited in support of the majority holding, and the case seems to be res integra. DIVORCE. (ABANDONMENT — INSANITY OF DE FENDANT.) WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT.

In Fisher v. Fisher, 46 Southeastern Re porter, 118, a wife is held entitled to divorce for wilful abandonment and desertion con tinuing for three years during which the husband was sane, though subsequently he became insane and at the time of the com mencement of the suit was a lunatic. Rathbun v. Rathbun, 40 How. Pr. 328; Douglas z-. Douglas, 31 Iowa, 421; and Cook n. Cook, 53 Barb. 180, are cited as authority, for the holding. It is also held that the insanity of Defendant does not prevent the prosecution of a suit for divorce.