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62 Mich. 181, 28 N. W. 826, 4 Am St. Rep. 836, in which it was said, in substance, that in fixing the amount of alimony, the court is entitled to have all the facts which would influence its decision laid before it, and it cannot be supposed that an allowance would be made of a gross sum for permanent ali mony if the court knew that the wife had contracted to pay a portion thereof to her attorney. Such contracts are' against public policy for another reason. Public policy is interested in maintaining the family relation, and in promoting reconciliation between the parties. Contracts like this one tend direct ly to prevent reconciliation, and to bring around an alienation of husband and wife, by offering a strong inducement, amounting to a premium, to attorneys to promote the dissolution of the marriage tie. In the case at bar, the court distinguishes Chadwick v. Walsh, 70 Mich. 627, 38 N. W. 602, saying that the validity of the agreement therein was not questioned. It is also held that where the only contract an attorney has for compensation is void, he is entitled to re cover what his services were reasonably worth. BENEFIT INSURANCE. (EXEMPTION OF AssociTION FROM GARNISHMENT— CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE—EIJUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS— SPECIAL PRIVILEGES.) TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS.

In Supreme Lodge United Benevolent Association v. Johnson, 77 Southwestern Reporter 661, the constitutionality of Act May ii, 1899, Sec. 16, exempting from gar nishment, benefits payable by fraternal bene ficial associations, is reviewed. The act was attacked as violating the fourteenth amend ment, prohibiting the denial by a state of equal protection of the laws, and also as vio lating Article i, Sec. 3, of the Texas consti tution, prohibiting exclusive privileges; it being first urged that the distinction be tween fraternal insurance associations and other insurance companies was an invalid discrimination. Williams v. Donough, 65 Ohio St. 400, 63 N. E. Rep. 84, 56 L. R. A.

766, relied on by appellee, is distinguished by the court, and in view of the settled dis tinction in Texas jurisprudence between fra ternal associations and other insurance com panies, the act is held not open to this ob jection. In Section 16, however, certain named beneficial associations are exempted from its operation, and this the court holds renders the act a violation of the constitu tional provisions mentioned, and inasmuch as the act must be regarded as an entirety this infirmity invalidates it in toto. BUCKET SHOP. (PROHIBITION— POWER OF CITY.) ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT.

In City of Hot Springs v. Rector, 76 Southwestern Reporter, 1056, a general power given cities to "license, regulate, tax or suppress brokers" is held to authorize an ordinance prohibiting bucket shops, and re quiring of applicants for brokers' licences a sworn statement that they are not doing a bucket shop business. The court says that the city had a sound discretion in fixing the terms on which it would grant a license, and this discretion would not be interfered with except when it was abused, to the hurt of the citizen com plaining. The presumption is that the city council's precautions were wise and proper, and unless some private right is shown to be infringed, the abstract rights of individuals need not be discussed, for the mere claim of private privilege must yield to the police power of the State. No authorities are cited. CHURCHES. (NUISANCE- NOISY SERVICE— RIGHT OF CITY то RESTRAIN.) KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS.

In Boyd v. Board of Councilmen, 77 Southwestern Reporter, 669, the right of a city to prevent the erection of a church build ing, on the ground that the services which will be held therein will be of such a noisy character as to constitute a nuisance, is ad judicated and decided adversely to the city. Ky. St., Sec. 3290, subs. 14-16, empower.« third-class cities to prevent the establish