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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES OF IMPORTANCE FROM THE NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM. (Copies of the pamphlet Reporters containing full reports of any of these decisions may be secured from the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, at 25 cents each. In ordering, the title of the desired case should be given as well as the citation of volume and page of the Reporter in which it is printed.)

ANIMAL. (GOOSE— RUNNING OF RAILROAD TRAIN —ALARM WHISTLE— LIABILITY FOR KILLING.) TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT.

In Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Davis, 78 Southwestern Reporter 1050, a goose is held not to be an "animal or obstruction," within Shannon's Code, Sec. 1574, sub-sec. 4, requiring railroad trains to sound the alarm whistle and apply the brakes, and use every possible means to stop the train, when an "animal or obstruction" appears on the track. It is also held that in the absence of recklessness or common-law negligence, a railroad company is not liable for the killing of geese permitted to run at large and which trespass on the right of way. No cases are referred to. The court says: "It is true, a goose has animal life, and, in the .broadest sense, is an animal; but we think the statute does not require the stopping of trains to prevent running over birds, such as geese, chickens, ducks, pigeons, canaries, or other birds that may be kept for pleasure or pro fit. Birds have winpe to move them quickly from places of danger, and it is presumed that they will use them (a violent presump tion, perhaps, in the case of a goose, an ani mal which appears to be loath to stoop from its dignity to even escape a passing train) But the line must be drawn somewhere, and we are of the opinion that the goose is a proper bird to draw it at. We do not mean to say that in the case of recklessness and common-law negligence there might not be a recovery for killing geese, chickens, ducks, or other fowls, for that case is not presented. Snakes, frogs, and fishing worms, when upon railroad tracks, are, to some extent, obstruc tions; but it was not contemplated by the statute that for such obstructions as these trains should be stopped, and passengers delaved."

APPEAL. (APPELLATE JURISDICTION—AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY—ACTION FOR A DEBT — STATU TORY PROVISION.) MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS.

In Marsh v. Kansas City Southern Rail way Co., 78 Southwestern Reporter, 285, plaintiff sued for the negligent killing of her husband, asking and recovering judgment for $4,500. Rev. St. 1899, Sec. 2864, fixes $5,000 as the liability which a defendant must forfeit in a case of this kind. But the plaintiff sued for $500 less, thus bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals for review rather than the supreme court. The court holds that the statute is not strictly a penal one, so that suit may be for less than $5,000, and having sued for less, the amount sued for is the amount "in dis pute" as regards appellate jurisdiction. A number of cases are discussed, none which are directly in point. Proctor v. Railway Co., 64 Mo. 112, 122, in which it was de clared that the damages recoverable under the statute were $5,000, no more, and no less," is distinguished, as is also Rafferty v. Railway Co., 15 Mo. App. 559. Why plaintiff desired to avoid the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not indicated, but it is understood that that tribunal is behind with its docket. ATTORNEY'S FEE. (DIVORCE CASE— PERCENTAGE OF ALIMONY—VOID CONTRACT.) MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT.

In McCurdy v. Dillon, 98 Northwestern Reporter 746, a contract between attorney and client for an attorney's fee, consisting of a percentage of the alimony to be recov ered in a divorce case, is held void, as con travening public policy. The case is said to fall directly within Jordan v. Westerman,