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United States, and the arguments which are based upon our treaty rights are clearly fal lacious. In so far I entirely agree with the views and arguments of Prof. Woolsey and the critics. But was there no other ground upon which the conduct of the administration in this affair can be defended? I think there is. The recognition of the independence of Panama must be justified, if at all justifiable under the circumstances, as an act of politi cal intervention. It was an interference in the internal affairs of Columbia which, al though not an act of war in itself, would have justified a declaration of war by Co lumbia against the United States. I believe the correct, normal, everyday rule of international law to be that of non intervention. Although history teems with instances of intervention on various grounds and under divers pretexts, the principle of non-intervention is a necessary corollary of the Grotian doctrine of the independ ence and equality of sovereign States. In tervention should be regarded as an alto gether abnormal and exceptional procedure which can only be justified on high political or moral grounds, and which should never be resorted to except in those rare and excep tional cases where, e. g., great crimes against humanity are being perpetrated (as in the case of Cuba), or where essential and per manent national or international interests of far-reaching importance are at stake (as in the case of Panama). While the habit of obedience to law and custom is the essential condition of all true liberty, every nation as well as every in dividual certainly admits in practice, if not in theory, that there are occasions or circumstances which may furnish a justifica tion for acting independently, if not in direct violation, of established law and custom. Just as there are essential and permanent interests of organized society before which the technical and vested rights of individuals and corporations must give way in particu lar and exceptional instances, so there are vested rights of "sovereignty," exercised by unscrupulous or incompetent "sovereigns,"

which must give way before the essential and permanent "interests of collective civil ization." It seems to me that critics of the type of Prof. Woolsey do not take sufficient cog nizance of the fact that beyond, and in some respects aboi'c, the well-cultivated field of in ternational law there lie vast and partially unexplored regions of national and interna tional policy and morality where motives of interest, policy, morality, and humanity pre vail. These may be in harmony with estab lished laws and customs; but they are just as likely to be independent of, and may be directly antagonistic to, recognized rules and principles. Practical statesmen and men of the world are perhaps more apt to realize this than mere students who derive most of their knowledge from books and documents. Might it not be pertinent for some of us to ask ourselves such questions as these? Have the statesmen who contributed most toward the building of such modern empires as those of Russia, France, Germany and Great Britain always been governed by a scrupulous regard for established forms and precedents? Does the United States thoroughly respect the sovereignty of the unstable and revolutionary governments of Spanish America? Was not—to cite but one instance—Japan recently compelled by the force of circumstances to violate the sacred neutrality of the sovereign State of Korea? To ask such questions is to answer them. It is but too true that the doctrine of in terest, necessity, or expediency has always been the plea of the tyrant and the con queror; but the misuse or misapplication of a doctrine does not invalidate its general truth or impair its validity for those who possess the political wisdom and sense of discrimination necessary to its proper use and application. We must learn to discrim inate between essential and permanent in terests and temporary or selfish expediency, to distinguish between reality and pretext; to know our friends from our enemies. AMOS S. HERSHEV. Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, March 7, 1904.