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 Editorial Department CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of THE GREEN BAG : SIR:—Although the recent action of the United States Senate has made the "Pan ama Question" one of purely historical or academic interest, you will perhaps permit me to offer a few comments upon the tenor of the arguments of those who opposed the conduct of the administration in this mat ter, more particularly upon the extremely able and suggestive. article by Prof. Woolsey, published in THE GREEN BAG for January. These arguments have, generally speak ing, been based upon the assumption that in ternational questions of this character— questions affecting the interests of many na tions and of future generations—must, in all cases and under all circumstances, be set tled, if settled at all, by a strict adherence to certain forms and precedents which are sup posed to have been fully established by in ternational practice. It is far from my purpose to throw any discredit upon the propriety or validity of these forms or precedents; for they are the result of a long and gradual process of de velopment, in the absence of which we would be like a ship at sea without chart or com pass. Nor is it primarily my purpose to de fend the conduct of the administration in this particular instance, although I believe it to have been fully justified under the circum stances. I merely wish to call the attention of your readers to a few genera of facts that are generally ignored or overlooked by that class of writers and critics of which Prof. Woolsey seems to be a type. In the first place, I would observe that in ternational law, which is supposed to be based upon international practice or custom, is in a state of constant growth and that the critics in question do not perhaps sufficiently realize that a slavish adherence to its forms and precedents, at all times and under all circumstances, would be fatal to this de velopment. In the next place, a slight examination of historical precedents would suffice to show that international practice has varied a great deal in such matters as the recognition of

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the independence of insurgent communities. Lack of space will not permit me to enter upon such an inquiry; but it will, I think, be sufficient for my purpose simply to point tothis variation in international practice in the cases of the recognition of the United States by France; of the South American Repub lics by England and the United States; and of Texas and Cuba by the United States. There can, however, be no doubt as to the rule which should be followed in ordinary cases and under normal conditions. Accord ing to this rule, which was followed in the cases of the South American Republics and Texas, an insurgent community should not be recognized until "independence is estab lished as a matter of fact.'' The propriety and validity of this rule in ordinary cases is admitted by President Roosevelt (See his special message to Congress on Jan. 4, 1904). So far there is no dispute. "But," Presi dent Roosevelt continues, "like the principle from which it is derived (the principle of non-intervention) the rule is subject to exceptions, and there are clear and imperative reasons why a departure from it was justified and even required in the present instance. These reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; second, our national interests and safety; and third, the interests of collective civilization." The real questions at issue may thus be re duced to two. (i) Are there any such exceptions? (2) Did the Panama case con stitute such an exception? (i) That there are exceptions where, as Hall (3d edition, p. 90) says, "reasons of pol icy interfere to prevent strict attention tolaw," or which, as Lawrence (3d edition, p. 120) observes, "cannot be brought within the ordinary rules of international law," is admit ted by leading authorities on international law as well as demonstrated by historical ex amples. (2) Did the Panama casé constitute such an exception? Many of the arguments which have been advanced in defence of the conduct of the administration are clearly ab surd or fallacious. It is absurd to put forth the claim that Panama had actually achieved its independence prior to recognition by the