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 Rh be explained by any single analogy or prin ciple. The imposition of the burden upon others than the promisor and the acquisition of the benefit by others than the promisee are the results of two very different princi ples. The burden is imposed upon a subsequent possessor of the res, whether real or per sonal, upon the same principle that the grantee of a guilty trustee, or the grantee of one already under contract to sell the res to another, is bound to convey the res to the cestui que trust or prior buyer. In all three cases there would be the like injustice, if the purchaser with notice, or the volunteer, were allowed to profit at the expense of the ccsttti qtie trust or promisee by ignoring the trust, the promise to convey, or the restric tive agreement. Equity, therefore, in all three cases imposes upon the grantee a con structive duty co-extensive with the express diitv of his grantor. The right of third persons to the benefit of restrictive agreements is the result of the equally just and equally simple principle, that equity will compel the promisor to per form his agreement according to its tenor. If thé íestrictive agreement, fairly interpreted, was intended for the sole benefit of the prom isee, only he can enforce it. If on the other hand it was intended for the benefit of the occupant or occupants of adjoining lands, then such occupant or occupants may com pel its specific performance. It is to be observed that a grantee of the promisee acquires his rights not as assignee of the restrictive contract, but as assignee of the promisee's land. Accordingly the assignee of the land is none the less entitled to the benefit of the agreement, although there was no assignment of the contract, or even al though he was ignorant of its existence when he acquired the land. The assignee's situa tion in this respect is closelv analogous to the rights of the buyer of land from one to whom it had been previouslv sold with warrantv. The last buyer enforces the war ranty of the first seller not as assignee of the warranty, but as assignee of the land,

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for that is the meaning of the warrantor's undertaking. The analogy between the re strictive agreement and a warranty holds also in other respects. As the assignee of the land may sue upon the warranty in his own name without joining the warrantee, so the subsequent possessor of the neighbor ing land may, as sole plaintiff, file his bill for an injunction against the promisor. A warrantee, who' has conveyed the land to another, can no longer enforce the war ranty; in like manner a promisee who has parted with all of his land in the neighbor hood loses the right to enforce the restrictive agreement. A release of the warranty by the warrantee after his conveyance to an other is inoperative: a release of the restric tive agreement by the promisee after part ing with his land in the neighborhood is like wise of no effect as to the land conveyed by him. A bona fide purchaser from the war rantee acquires the warranty free from any equitable defenses good against the war rantee; it is believed that an innocent pur chaser from the promisee should be allowed to enforce performance of a restrictive agree ment, although the promisors might have defeated a suit by the promisee on the ground of fraud or by reason of some other equit able defense. But no case has been found involving this question. These qualities, common to the warranty and the restrictive agreement, indicate that they both belong in the same class with bills and notes. For the holder of a bill or note sues in his own name, acquires his ri^ht. not as assignee of a chose in action, but as the persona rlesignata within the tenor of the instrument, and if a bona fide purchaser, holds free from equities and equitable de fenses. If the right to enforce restrictive agreements were limited to assignees of the land, in privity of estate with the promisees, they, like assignees of a warranty, would bo assimiliated to indorsees of a bill or note payable to order. The restrictive agreement, however, is frequently intended to enure to the benefit of any possessor subsequent to the promisee, or even to one who acquired