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member of the pool, he must obtain the right from the association. These rights were sold over the table at a secret auction conducted by the central body. Did Atlanta advertise for iron pipe, Atlanta was p:it up for the highest bidder, who paid the bonus bid into 'the treasury of the pool. The firm that had thus bought Atlanta had the right to make such a price to her as pleased it. The other members of the combination, on request, were bound to aid by furnishing a fictitious competition by putting in tenders higher yet. So that all that appeared to the eye was that the prices for iron pipe were mounting higher and higher. In the course of the final decision, Mr. Jus tice Peckham said1: "The combination thus had a direct, immediate and intended relation to and effect upon the subsequent contract to sell and deliver the pipe. It was to obtain that particular and specific result that the combination was formed, and but for the re striction resulting high prices would not have obtained. We have no doubt that where the direct and immediate effect of a contract or combination among particular dealers in a commodity is to destroy competition be tween them and others, so that the parties to the contract may obtain increased prices for themselves, such contract or combination amounts to a restraint of trade in the com modity, even though contracts to buy such commodity are continually being made. Total restraint of trade in the commodity is not necessary in order to render the com bination one in restraint of trade. All of these cases show that a well-knit or ganization often has the power to control even the modern market, wide as it is. It is the recognition of this possibility that makes the law against the conspiracy to control the market so thorough-going. For there is no doubt, unfortunately, how any body of busi ness men will act when they get control of the market. It is a practical certainty that if they can get beyond the reach of «ompetition

they will raise prices. As it is this competi tion which in the usual case protects the pub lic by its unvarying action, the policy of the law is to perpetuate it by breaking up all such combinations.1 V. In this last decade the ingenuity of attor neys acting in behalf of clients who wished to bring about a community of interests has led to a change of base at least four times .during this brief period. The four plans thus tried with such indifferent success have been: First, the pool—a direct agree ment between the corporations concerned for their joint operation to a certain extent; second, the trust—an indirect arrangement between the shareholders to control the ac tion of their corporations; third, the holding corporation—a central company to hold the shares of the constituent companies; and fourth, the single corporation which buys the properties of the combining corporations outright. The modern problem still unsolved is, how may various corporations be concen trated under one control? It will give a bet ter understanding of these—the present con dition, if one example is cited of each. The leading case against the combination of corporations by any partnership is Whittenton Mills г: Upton (10 Gray 582). The report of the master disclosed the following facts: The Whittenton Mills were incorpor ated by Statute 1836, Chapter 19, for the pur pose of manufacturing cotton goods. Before 1850, an agreement of copartnership was entered into between the Whittenton Mills and W. Mason. This partnership, under the firm name of William Mason & Company, carried on an extensive business in the manu facturing of machinery for cotton mills; 1 The following cases, among others, hold a conspiracy to suppress competition illegal : Anon, 12 Mod. 248: U. S. v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 605; Lowry r. Tile Ass'n, 98 Ft.d. 897; State -: Ins. Co., 66 Ark. 466; State v. Phipps, 50 Kans. 609: Woodenware Ass'n v. Starkie, 84 Mich. 76; Slate r. Firemans Club, 152 Mo. 44; Lücke i Assembly, 77 Md. 396; Ertz v. Exchange, 79 Minn. 140; Stahl v. Schlitz Co., 104 Tenn. 715; Richards v. Desk Co. 87 Wis. 503.'