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mon weal. In a true Democracy, this won derful ability is always an element of grea: strength, and its intrinsic value in a public servant cannot be over-estimated.. It is easy to see how a mere aristocrat, or one with aristocratic notions or tendencies, discounts such qualities in a public servant. Yet it is a truism, in a representative government, that the most efficient and the most successful public servants are those that hew close to the lines indicated by enlightened public sen timent and opinion. But it is not true that Lincoln's ability :was mainly manifested in the cultivation of the approving smile of the multitude. Nor does it anywhere appear that he sacrificed the in terests of his constituents for such recogni tion. His ability to take the public pulse accurately was intuitive. And he took it, not that he might shape his official policy by it, but in order the better to determine how far, in what direction, and to what extent, the uncertain and fickle masses would sustain his policy. Mr. Lincoln's advisors and those holding confidential positions in his adminis tration during the dark days of the Civil War, unhesitatingly declare that he was always a leader and never a blind follower. It is sub mitted that such characters do not ride to dis tinction, and influence, and power, on a pop ular wave of approval. Mr. Lincoln was essentially a man of peace. It nowhere appears that he was in favor of war. How earnestly he tried to convince the South, in his First Inaugural, of his purpose to allow it to remain in peace with the insti tution of slavery, is well known. By propos ing indemnities for slaves it was his hope and desire to avoid bloodshed. Xot only was such a course commendable from a purely humanitarian point of view, but it was also wise and politic, as subsequent events demon strated. For it contributed to the making of public opinion in favor of the maintenance of the Union by using forcible means to sup press the impending crisis, if peaceable means

proved unavailing. Mr. Lincoln and the po litical party which placed him in power, were committed to that proposition. The policy of his administration, during the early part thereof, involving, as it did, negotiations and peaceable methods of solving threatening problems of portentous dimensions in the South, was not "mistaken"' or "fatuous," but statesmanlike, noble, and wise. It was am ply justified by the feverish condition of the public pulse, was in exact accord with the spirit of American thought and American institutions, and was, moreover, thoroughly philanthropic. It is Professor Smith's conviction that "the war was not ably administered while the man agement was in Lincoln's hands. The great service which Grant rendered was that of taking the war out of the hands of all civilians and grasping it as his own." Mr. Smith evi dently forgets, or, perhaps, he did not know, that the President is made, by the Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy. And it matters not whether it is Grant at the front winning victories from the enemy, or McClellan losing battles and pres tige. The responsible head is always the same. And it was Lincoln who saw the necessity for a change of leaders in the field, when Grant was placed first in command of the army at the front. But Mr. Smith's opinions of Mr. Lincoln as a military man are again at fault. General Sherman has said that Mr. Lincoln's military views, as evidenced in his correspondence with his generals, was remarkable for its cor rectness. General W. F. Smith says that he "has long held to the opinion that at the close of the war Mr. Lincoln was the superior of his generals in his comprehension of the effect of strategic movements and the proper method of following up victories to their legi timate conclusions." Another prominent army officer calls Mr. Lincoln "the ablest strategist of the war." With such opinions from such sources, what wonder is it that