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the proper bounds of judicial dignity; its style is more suited for an argument at the bar. This, however, is a small matter. A more important consideration is the sugges tion that his touch was not as sure in this class of cases as in many others. In his de termination to give a case the benefit of his own independent thought, it has seemed to many that he often failed to give due con sideration to the judgment of others. He was also fond of concurring in a conclusion by an independent course of reasoning; and, most obvious of all, was his habit of follow ing lines of thought and reasoning unneces sary to the determination of the issue. See, for instance, Hans г: Virginia, 134 U. S. I. But with all the shortcomings that may be reasonably attributed to him, and irrespective of his intellectual attainments, Justice Bradley was a man of whom any pro fession might be proud. Never did abuse fall so far short of its mark as in attempting to impeach his integrity in the performance of a disagreeable but unavoidable duty. And the integrity of his character was enforced by a genuine simplicity and modesty which only the finest natures attain. Writing to an intimate friend who had congratulated him upon his appointment to the bench, he said: "As to my elevation to the bench, the words of Coleridge keep coming to my mind: 'It sounds like stories from the land of spirits If any man obtains that which he merits, Or any merit that which he obtains.'

And I ask myself, does not that indeed apply to me? Am I not really one that hath obtained that which he doth not merit?" Turning now to his work as found in the law reports, the keynote of his con stitutional views may be found in Ex parte Siebold, loo U. S. 371, where he formulated the doctrine of the concurrent powers of

national and State governments over Con gressional elections. "The greatest difficulty in coming to a just conclusion," he said in the course of that opinion, "arises from mis taken notions with regard to the relations which subsist between the State and national governments. It seems to be often over looked that a national constitution has been adopted in this country, establishing a real government therein, operating upon persons and territory and things; and which, more over, is, or should be, as dear to every American citizen as his State government is, Whenever the true conception of the nature of this government is once conceded, no real difficulty will arise in the just interpretation of its powers. But if we allow ourselves to regard it as a hostile organization, opposed to the proper sovereignty and dignity of the State governments, we shall continue to be vexed with difficulties as to its jurisdiction and authority. No greater jealousy is required to be exercised toward this govern ment in reference to the preservation of our liberties than is proper to be exercised toward the State governments. Its powers are limited in number, and clearly defined; and its action within the scope of those powers is restrained by a sufficiently rigid bill of rights for the protection of its citizens from oppression. The true interest of the people of this country requires that both the national and the State governments should be allowed, without jealous interfer ence on either side, to exercise all the powers which respectively belong to them according to a fair and practical construction of the Constitution. State rights and the rights of the United States should be equally respect ed. Roth are essential to the preservation of our liberties and the perpetuity of our in stitutions. But, in endeavoring to vindicate the one, we should not allow our zeal to nullify or impair the other." To the same effect is his vigorous con curring opinion in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall.