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 A Century of Federal, Judicature. doctrine of this court, that whenever one's property is used in such a manner as to af fect the community at large it becomes by that fact clothed with a public interest, and ceases to be juris privati only, appears to me to destroy, for all useful purposes, the effi cacy of the constitutional guaranty. All that is beneficial in property arises from its use, and the fruits of that use; and whatever de prives a person of them deprives him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title and possession. If the constitutional guaranty extends no further than to prevent a depriva tion of title and possession, and allows a de privation of use, it does not merit the en comiums it has received." No considerations of State sovereignty were conclusive in his mind when the civil rights of the individual were at stake. He •therefore dissented from the majority of the court in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 728, where recourse was denied to the creditors of a State on its repudiated obligations. "It would puzzle, the wit of man," he said, "to find anywhere in the legislation of the world a more perfect assurance of the fixed purpose of a State to keep faith with her creditors, or of a pledge of a portion of her revenues for their payment, or of the submission of her officers to the compulsory process of the judicial tribunals to carry out her engage ments;" and he dissented from the conclu sion of the majority that the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts was of no efficacy against repudiation by the State, and asserted his purpose of continuing his protest "until the prohibition inserted in the Constitution as a barrier against the agrarian and despoil ing spirit, which both precedes and follows a breach of public faith, is restored to its original vigor." "If a State contracts to do certain things, and in order that they may be performed, subjects her officers to the control of the courts, and makes their refusal to carry out her pledges a felony, it cannot be justly

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contended that her reserved rights are at all invaded if her officers are judicially com manded to do what she says they shall do. ... If the State is above the Constitu tion of the United States; if the protection of that instrument does not extend to her en gagements with individuals; if her power is as absolute as the Parliament of England; if the theory of the Federal Constitution, that it binds States as well as individuals, is un sound; if it is not, as it declares itself to be, the supreme law of the land.—then my posi tion falls; but otherwise there is no answer to it—at least none that I have been able to see." See also his dissent in Antoni v. Greenhow. 107 U. S. 784. He had the satis faction of having these views adopted in part in the subsequent Virginia Coupon Cases. Justice Field believed in the equality of all men before the law. This is the fundamental conception of his great dissenting opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36. In that case he contended that the war amend ments were intended for whites as well as blacks; that they conferred upon all alike, if born in the United States or naturalized, citizenship in the United States. He did not question the power of the States over all matters of internal concern, nor did he seek to impair in any way the exercise of any au thority which the States had theretofore ex ercised over their internal affairs. But he in sisted that in the exercise of the powers of the State there should be no unjust discrim ination against any classes or persons by giving to some rights and privileges denied to others in like condition. In other words, he insisted that in the exercise of the police powers the rule of equality should prevail. "This equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and partial enactments, in the lawful pursuits of life, throughout the whole country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them, everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without other restric