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bold and vigorous opinion in the latter case he made a memorable contribution to Fed eral jurisprudence by extending the Federal admiralty jurisdiction over the great lakes and their connecting waters. "These lakes," he said, "are in truth inland seas. Different States border on them on one side, and a for eign nation on the other. A great and grow ing commerce is carried on upon them be tween different States and a foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents and haz ards that attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered on them, and prizes been made, and every reason which existed for the grant of admiralty jur isdiction to the General Government on the Atlantic Seas applies with equal force to the lakes. . . The only objection made to this jurisdiction is that there is no tide in the lakes or the waters connecting them; and it is said that the admiralty and maritime juris diction, as known and understood in Eng land and in this country at the time the Con stitution was adopted, was confined to the ebb and flow of the tide. Now there is cer tainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that makes the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, or anything in the ab sence of a tide that renders it unfit. If it is a public navigable water on which com merce is carried on between different States and nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same. And if a distinction is made on that account it is merely arbitrary, without any foundation in reason; and, in deed, would seem to be inconsistent with it." It remains to consider the Dred Scott case. Even at this late day, a statement of the is sues involved and of the court's procedure may serve a useful purpose. Dred Scott, a negro of African descent, brought an action in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Missouri to establish his freedom. In order to give the necessary jurisdiction he described himself as a citizen of the State of Missouri, and the defendant, the adminis

trator of his reputed master, as a citizen of the State of New York. The defendant in terposed a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging that the plaintiff was not a citizen of Mis souri, because he was a negro of African de scent whose ancestors had been brought to this country and sold as slaves. To this plea there was a general demurrer, which was sus tained. The defendant then pleaded in bar of the action that the plaintiff was the property of the defendant. The case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts, from which it appeared that in 1834 Scott was a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the United States Army. In that year Dr. Emerson took the plaintiff to a military post at Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until 1836. Scott was then removed to Fort Snelling, north of the State of Missouri, and held there until 1838, when he was taken to Missouri, where he was afterwards sold to the defend ant as a slave. It also appeared that Scott had theretofore brought suit for his freedom in the Missouri courts, and that the Supreme Court of that State had decided adversely to him. At the trial there was a verdict and judg ment for the defendant, whereupon the plain tiff brought the case to the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error. Upon the record thus made there were, therefore, two main questions: upon the plea to the juris diction, whether Scott could be a "citizen"; upon the plea to the merits, his personal status as affected by his residence in a free Territory, and his return to Missouri, which involved the consideration of the constitu tional power of Congress to prohibit slavery in a part of the Louisiana Territory. If, therefore, the court should decide that he was a citizen, notwithstanding his African de scent, then the case would necessarily be ex-imined upon the merits; but if it decided that he could not be a citizen, then, according to recognized procedure, the case should have