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 Chief Justice Taney. case it followed the supreme court of the State in deciding that Scott was not entitled to free dom. Scott then took the case by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the opinion of the majority was delivered by the Chief Justice. The general conclusions reached in the opinion were : "1 . A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a citizen within the meaning of the constitution of the United States. 2. The clause in the constitution authorizing congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the government of the territory and other property of the United States, applies only to territory within the chartered limits of some one of the States when they were colonies of Great Britain, and which was surrendered by the British government to the federation of the States in the treaty of peace. It does not apply to territory acquired by the present federal government by treaty or conquest from a foreign nation. 3. The constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as property and pledges the federal government to protect it, and congress cannot exercise any more authority over property of that de scription, than it may constitutionally exer cise over property of any other kind. 4. The plaintiff acquired no title to freedom by being taken by his owner to Rock Island, Illinois, and brought back to Missouri, be cause his status or condition as a person of African descent depended on the laws of the State in which he resided, and it had been settled by the decision of the highest court in Missouri that by the laws of that State a slave does not become entitled to his free dom where the owner takes him to reside in a State where slavery is not permitted and afterward brings him back to Missouri." In view of the wide range of the opinion and the number and character of the sub

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jects covered, the Chief Justice's own state ment of the questions presented is interest ing, for it gave tremendous force to such temperate criticism as the opinion received. He said : " There are two leading questions presented by the record. 1. Had the cir cuit court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between the parties? 2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judg ment it has given erroneous or not?" Naturally enough this was taken as an ad mission that when the court reached the conclusion that Scott was not a citizen and that the circuit court was, therefore, with out jurisdiction to determine the case be tween the parties, no other question properly remained for consideration. With respect to the citizenship of Scott the opinion con tained much learning gathered from English history and adjudications to show the status of the negro in the civilization at the time of the adoption of our constitution and anterior thereto, and a careful analysis of much legis lation by congress, by the colonies and by the States, to support the conclusion reached, that Scott, because of his blood and ancestry, was not a citizen, and that the circuit court was, therefore, without jurisdiction to de termine the case between the parties. Hav ing reached that conclusion, the Chief Justice evidently realized that some reason of a ju ridical character was necessary to justify the court in passing upon questions which the circuit court had not authority to determine. The view by which he attempted to justify that course must have seemed strange then, for it had never been advanced before. It seems scarcely less strange now, for it has never been advanced since. But he satisfied himself with the reasons given for consider ing Scott's claimed right to freedom for him self and family because of the residence with their former master at Fort Snelling, and he proceeded to consider it. Their right to