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 Juries and Their Verdicts.

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JURIES AND THEIR VERDICTS. Bv John De Morgan. WHAT is the extent of the responsibility of a judge for the verdict of the jury? This question has been raised once more in England, and lawyers are divided. It is common ground that the judge should as sist the jury in coming to a decision, and give them the benefit of his knowledge and experience, not merely as to the law, but also as to the facts and the proper inferences to be drawn from them. But supposing that he has done his best to guide the jury in the right direction, and in spite of his efforts they give a verdict which is, in his opinion, a wrong one, is he responsible? In questions of fact, is it not more likely that the jury should be right than the judge? I once heard a celebrated English judge lecture a jury whose verdict, he maintained, was not in accord with the facts, when the foreman boldly interjected, "That is your opinion, my lord." The judge grew angry, and asserted that he was able to decide on the merits of the evidence, to which the foreman of the jury replied, "Very likely, my lord, but so are we; and we are twelve, while you are only one." If a man is acquitted when the judge thinks he ought to have been convicted, is he responsible, or can he make the jury bear the burden? Certainly the judge is power less, and can only give vent to his feelings as did the worthy wearer of the ermine who, in discharging a prisoner, said, "The jury declare you innocent, but don't do it again." Lord Bramwell, better known as Justice Hawkins, was once astonished by the jury returning a verdict of "not guilty" in a case where the judge thought the evidence con clusive. He asked the foreman to repeat the verdict, and then almost shouted: "Louder, sir, let the world hear your verdict." Turn ing to the prisoner, he told him that the

jury, in their superior wisdom, had disre garded the evidence, but that he disagreed with them, and was sure that the man was guilty; however, he had to discharge him. At a trial held in Wales, in November, 1901, Mr. Justice Phillimore took occasion to berate a jury for liberating a prisoner. He even told the prisoner that he ought to have been convicted, nay more, that it would have been better for him if he had been con victed. This was going very far, for a man is pre sumed to be innocent until he is convicted, and surely an acquittal by a jury is presump tive proof of innocence, and the judge was guilty of slander. Some judges have upheld the right of the jury by declaring that twelve men listening to the evidence were better judges of fact than any one person, judge though he might be. The!atc Sir George Tessel, Master of the Rolls, was verv like the lamented Artemas Ward; he agreed that any one whose opin ions were like his own, must be right. I was frequently in his court, and on one oc casion, a distinguished barrister referred sneeringly to a verdict of a jury, whereupon the most learned Master of the Rolls stopped him, and reminded him that a jury was a judge of fact, and that twelve men listening to the same evidence, were not likely to be mistaken. Emboldened by this, I. unfor tunately, some time later, mentioned a ver dict given by a jury, and the same judge snapped his fingers and exclaimed: "A fig for juries! They are swayed by popular clamor." At one time the jury was really a body of witnesses, and had no judicial function, save that they recorded what they had seen or heard. For many years justice was dispensed in