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are impeachable offenses; of what is im peachable matter and who is to determine it; of who are "civil officers" within the meaning of the Constitution; of what is "corrupt conduct in office," and " crimes and misdemeanors " within the meaning of the constitutional provision; these questions are all considered in a most luminous man ner, both under the authorities and from general principles. It will not be possible to reproduce many of these discussions. The limits of this article will not permit it. But we cannot forego the pleasure of pre senting a few of them. Here is Mr. Arnold's original discussion of the phrase " corrupt conduct in office." Not only is it unique and sound reasoning; it is also a classic in the law: "I am not aware that we have any defi nition in our statutes, or in the common law, or in the works of writers and commen tators on this term. I do not know, for I have not examined, whether that term is used in the Constitutions of the other States of the Union. It is not, however, a legal term; it is not known to the statute; it is not known to the common law. It is a moral term, and we must arrive at what was intended by it in the best way we can. It is possible it was a phrase introduced into the Constitution, on account of the uncertain construction of the terms ' crimes and mis demeanors,' and was designed to include such official misconduct as was obviously not indictable. It may have been used de signedly by the framers of the Constitution, to remove any doubt as to what was im peachable under the terms ' crimes and misdemeanors,' to settle the question whether it embraced anything that was not indictable, whether this general phraseology was not used to embrace any official miscon duct, which could not be punishable by statute. It certainly does not include errors

of judgment, mistakes, nor indiscretions, nor imprudences, for these are not corrupt, they are not contaminated with any moral taint. To establish corrupt conduct in office, there must be a wrongful act done with a bad motive, or with a guilty intention; in other words, to establish corrupt conduct in office, it must not only appear that some wrongful or illegal act has been done in office, but that it was done corruptly; or in other words, knowing that it was wrongful or illegal. The question is not so much as to the act as to the motive or intent with which it was done. The burden of proof on an impeachment in such a case, is on the prosecution; not only to show clearly the act charged, but also satisfactorily beyond a reasonable doubt, the corrupt intent. These are the positions which I assume and conscientiously urge upon the consideration of this Court: that before the respondent can be convicted on an impeachment for corrupt conduct in office, it must be made out clearly by the prosecution that some wrongful or illegal act has been done by him, and they must make it out further to the satisfaction of the Court, beyond a rea sonable doubt, that he has done an act in tentionally and corruptly, knowing it to be wrongful or illegal." Mr. Arnold argued with great force and earnestness that impeachable matter was solely within the province of the Court; that it was for the Senate to say what it is on which they will compel the accused to defend himself before them, what it is that gives them jurisdiction over the case, over his person, and over his fate. This view was opposed by the other side. Mr. Arnold expressed surprise that " the position was taken and urged upon this Court, that in the absence of any definition of what is im peachable matter, under the head of corrupt conduct in office, or crimes and misdemean