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McKinley three years ago when he sent in the recom technically in the fight. His real claim for credit rests mendations for promotion for the various officers upon his work as Commander-in-Chief; upon the excel connected with the Santiago squadron, basing these lence of the blockade; upon the preparedness of the recommendations upon his estimate of the credit to squadron; upon the arrangement of the ships head on in which the officers were respectively entitled. What I a semicircle around the harbor; and the standing orders have to decide, therefore, is whether or not President in accordance with which they instantly moved to the McKinley did injustice in the matter. This necessarily attack of the Spaniards when the latter appeared. For involves a comparison of the actions of the different all these things the credit is his. commanders engaged. The exhaustive official reports of Admiral Schley is rightly entitled — as is Captain the action leave little to be brought out anew; but as Cook — to the credit of w hat the " Brooklyn " did in the the question of Admiral Sampson's right to be considered fight. On the whole she did well; but I agree with the in chief command, which was determined in his favor by unanimous finding of the three admirals who composed President McKinley, and later by the Court of Claims, the Court of Inquiry as to the "loop." It seriously has never hitherto been officially raised, I deemed it marred the " Brooklyn's " otherwise excellent record, be best to secure statements of the commanders of the five ing in fact the one grave mistake made by any Ameri ships (other than the " Brooklyn" and " New York," the can ship that day. Had the " Brooklyn " turned to the flagships of the two admirals) which were actively en westward, that is, in the same direction that the Spanish gaged in the light. Admiral Philip is dead. I quote ex ships were going, instead of in the contrary direction, she tracts from his magazine article on the fight, written would undoubtedly have been in more " dangerous prox immediately after it occurred; closing with an extract imity" to them. But it would have been more danger from his letter to the Secretary of the Navy of February ous for them as wrell as for her! This kind of danger must not be too nicely weighed by those whose trade it 27, 1899. [Here follows a recital of statements by the said com is to dare greatly for the honor of the flag. Moreover, manders.] the danger was certainly not as great as that which, in These are the facts as set forth above in the state the selfsame moment, menaced Wainwright's fragile ments of the captains, and elsewhere in their official re craft as he drove forward against the foe. It was not in ports and testimony. They leave no room for doubt on my judgment as great as the danger to which the " Texas" any important point. was exposed by the turn as actually made. It certainly The question of command is in this case nominal and caused both the " Brooklyn " and the " Texas " materially technical. Admiral Sampson's ship, the " New York," to lose position compared to the fleeing Spanish vessels. was seen at the outset of the fight from all the other ships But after the loop had once been taken Admiral Schley except the " Brooklyn." Four of these five ship captains handled the "Brooklyn" manfully and well. She and have testified that they regarded him as present and in the " Oregon " were thenceforth the headmost of the command. He signaled " Close in " to the fleet as soon American vessels — though the "Iowa" certainly, and as the first Spanish ship appeared, but his signal was not seemingly the " Texas" also, did as much in hammering seen by any American vessel. He was actually under to a standstill the " Viscaya," " Oquendo," tnd "Teresa"; fire from the forts, and himself fired a couple of shots, at while the "Indiana" did all her eastward position and the close of the action with the torpedo boats, in addition crippled machinery permitted. In the chase of the to signaling the " Indiana " just at the close of the action. " Colon " the " Brooklyn " and " Oregon " share the But during the action not a single order from him was credit between them. received by any of the ships that were actively engaged. Under such circumstances it seems to me that the Admiral Schley at the outset of the action hoisted the recommendations of President McKinley were eminently two signals of " Clear ship " and " Close in," which was proper, and that so far as Admirals Sampson and Schley simply carrying out the standing orders of Admiral Samp were concerned it would have been unjust for him to son as to what should be done if the enemy's ships at have made other recommendations. Personally I feel tempted to break out of the harbor. Until after the that in view of Captain Clark's long voyage in the close of the first portion of the fight at the mouth of the "Oregon" and the condition in which he brought her to harbor, and until after he had made his loop and the the scene of service, as well as the way in which he actu Spanish ships were fleeing to the westward, not another ally managed her before and during the fight, it would American ship noticed a signal from him. When the have been well to have given him the same advance western pursuit had begun, the " Oregon," and the ment that was given Wainright. But waiving this, it is "Oregon " only, noticed and repeated one of his signals evident that Wainright was entitled to receive more of command. The captain of the " Oregon " then re than any of the other commanders; and that it was just garded him as in command, but did not in any shape or to Admiral Sampson that he should receive a greater way execute any movement or any action of any kind advance in numbers than Admiral Schley — there was whatsoever in accordance with any order from him. nothing done in the battle that warranted any unusual In short, the question as to which of the two men, reward for either. In short, as regards Admirals Samp Admiral Sampson or Admiral Schley, was at the time in son and Schley, I find that President McKinley did sub command, is of merely nominal character. Technically stantial justice, and that there would be no warrant for Sampson commanded the fleet, and Schley, as usual, the reversing his action. western division. The actual fact, the important fact, is Both Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley are now that after the battle was joined not a helm was shifted, on the retired list. In concluding their report the mem not a gun was fired, not a pound of steam was put on in bers of the Court of Inquiry, Admirals Dewey. Benham, the engine room aboard any ship actively engaged, in and Ramsay, unite in stating that they recommend that obedience to the order of either Sampson or Schley, save no further action be had in the matter. With this on their own two vessels. It was a captain's fight. recommendation I most heartily concur. There is no Therefore the credit to which each of the two is en excuse whatever from either side for any further agi titled rests on matters apart from the claim of nominal tation of this unhappy controversy. To keep it command over the squadron; for so far as the actual alive would merely do damage to the Navy and to the fight was concerned neither one nor the other in fact ex country. ercised any command. Sampson was hardly more than Theodore Roosevelt.