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actions was a pitfall into which the most wary sometimes fell. Moreover, right was liable to be defeated by mistakes in plead ing, by infinitesimal variances between the pleadings and the proof, and by the absence • or presence of merely nominal parties. If a surprise occurred at nisi prins the court was unable to adjourn the proceedings beyond a single day. But the crowning paradox of the legal procedure of the time was the fun damental rule of evidence which excluded absolutely the testimony of all witnesses who had the remotest interest in the* result. In other words, the rules of evidence were so carefully framed to exclude falsehood that very often truth itself wras unable to force its way through the barriers thus created. Non-suits flourished, not because there was no cause of action, but because the law refused the evidence of the only persons who could prove the cause of action. Chancery held out to suitors a lofty stand ard of right, but the suitor who became involved in its dilatory and vexatious procedure was apt to find it always just beyond his reach: it was a mirage which lured him on to further expense and delay. It applied a uniform procedure to contentious and administrative business alike, so that persons between whom there was really no dispute at all were compelled to engage in a useless con test. When the Court of Chancery applied to the law courts for assistance in determin ing questions of fact, the determination thus had was only raw material for the chancel lor's conscience: he could send it back for another determination, or he could simply disregard it. The pleadings were marvelous specimens of tautology and technicality. Evidence was gathered by means of written interrogatories, and witnesses were crossexamined in ignorance of their direct testi mony. The litigants were throughout the whole contest groping after one another in the dark. Moreover, as George Spence stated in 1839 in his work on the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, "no man as things then stood, could enter into

a chancery suit with any reasonable hope of being alive at its termination, if he had a determined adversary." Everybody even remotely interested in the matter was a ne cessary party to the suit, and whenever one of these parties died pending suit bills of review or supplemental suits were necessary to restore the symmetry of the litigation. Plainly, equity was a luxury which all save the rich must eschew. COMMON LAW COURTS. FROM I8OO TO THE REFORM BILL.

During the first quarter of the century the Court of King's Bench practically monopo lized common law litigation. Lord Ellenborough, the chief justice of this court at the beginning of the century (1802-18), was unquestionably the ablest judge among Lord Mansfield's immediate successors. He was a man of more general force than his pred ecessor, Kenyon, and his store of practical knowledge was quite as large. Although a judge of unquestioned integrity, he was nev ertheless in many ways a reactionist. His strong political and religious opinions, which often influenced his judgment in criminal causes, savored of the past, and he was a sturdy opponent of the rapidly rising senti ment for reform. In ordinary civil litigation, however, he gave great satisfaction, and his clear and concise opinions are still held in high esteem. He served at a time when the Napoleonic wars gave rise to novel and intri cate problems in commercial law, and the skill and judgment with which he deter mined these questions may be studied to advantage in Campbell's nisi prias reports. The following representative opinions will give a good idea of Lord Ellenborough's style and method: Higham i: Ridgeway, I East. 109; Elwes r. Mawe, 3 do. 98; Wain 7«. Warlters. 5 do. 10; Vicars v. Wilcodcs, 8 do. i : Godsall v. Boldero, 9 do. 72; Horn v. Raker, 9 do. 215; Disbury v. Thomas, 14 do. 323: Roe d. Earl of Berkeley г: Arch bishop of York, 6 do. TOI; Erie v. Rowcroft,