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that the mare was unsound and that he knew it, I have no doubt that he is answerable." From that time, at least, to the present day the law has always looked at the intent with which a man sells a horse. He cannot escape responsibility for putting off a worth less animal on a credulous purchaser by any mere form of words, unless he says, indeed, that the horse is unsound. The question is, does the seller intend that the buyer shall believe that the horse is sound, and free from vice, and is the horse sound, kind and true as represented? If so, well and good; if not, the law says that the seller has -played false with the buyer and that he must answer the consequences. Now let us look at the case of David Harum, which has been permitted to pass as innocent and inoffensive literature and as a proper subject for merriment on our stage. Observe the words which David uses in selling the horse to the deacon. He is recounting the warranty which followed the horse when he bought him. "He says to me, 'that hoss hain't got a scratch or a [-/impie on 'im. He's sound an' kind an'll stand without hitchin', and a lady 'ed drive him as well's a man.' " "That,'' said David, "was all true." Now it is perfectly apparent from a perusal of the book or from the stage performance that David had tried the horse, that he knew he was balky, that he had con trived a means of curing the horse for his own use and yet, when bargaining with the deacon, he purposely concealed each and every one of these facts. A man may perpe trate a fraud by concealment as well as by express word of mouth. The plain intent of David was to put off on the deacon, for a fancy price, a horse which he knew to be unfit for use, and no amount of juggling with words could have excused his conduct in the matter. The deacon wanted to buy a good, sound, serviceable horse. David Harum was perfectly aware of that fact and it was his duty to reveal the defects of his horse in order that the deacon might have a fair chance to accept or reject him. There

is no doubt that should such a case as this come before any ordinary court of law, the seller would have to pay back the money which he obtained on the sale with the costs of the suit. Here let it be noted, it is the man or woman who understands the law, who occupies the place of vantage from which to pass proper judgment on all matters of a moral nature which appear in our literature or on our stage. The legal mind better than any other mind knows, or ought to know, the difference between right and wrong. This has been the concern of the profession for ages past, and the forum of conscience is one into which all matters of doubtful propriety are finally taken for solution. Thus, in this case, which is likely to have produced so pernicious an effect upon the minds of innumerable people, we see how wiser the law is than a simple man, and how better than many who attempt to teach by letters. Is a thing right? Does it work justice? Is it founded on good prin ciple? These are the questions which always and forever come up, in consideration of such human affairs as pass under the eyes of men of the legal profession. In contrast with the humorous phase of the law there is its serious side, by which one traces the evolution of society. Lawyers read in the acts and decisions of times past what evolution has been going on in human affairs since the dawn of civilization. Men of the legal profession know the value of reason and of public opinion because it is these which affect legislation as well as judicial interpretation of laws. "Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law is nothing else but reason," said Sir Edward Coke. "Public opinion," said Mr. James Brice in his book on the American Com monwealth, "this vague fluctuating complex thing is the omnipotent yet indeterminate sovereign to whose voice every man listens, yet whose words, because he speaks with as many tongues as the waves of a boisterous sea, it is hard to catch." Nevertheless, the