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The Green Bag,

favorite prepossessions he was a sound judge. As a whole, clearness of perception, strength of judgment and wide acquaintance with the world of affairs are indelibly stamped upon his work. On many occasions his quick perception, good sense and dry humor were admirable solvents to the doubts and difficulties of his more subtle-minded brethren. A good instance is his characteriza tion of the distinction sought to be made in Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, between legal and actual fraud: "I do not think we need trouble ourselves about 'legal fraud/ nor whether it is a good or bad expression, because I hold that actual fraud must be proved in this case to make the defendants liable, and, as I understand, there is never any occasion to use the phrase 'legal fraud' except when actual fraud cannot be estab lished. 'Legal fraud' is only used when some vague ground of action is to be re sorted to, or, generally speaking, when the person using it will not take the trouble to find, or cannot find, what duty has been violated or right infringed, but thinks that a claim is somehow made out.'' In com mercial law, in particular, he was a recog nized authority. His powerful dissenting opinion in the Yagliano case (1891), A. C. 107, shows his familiarity with the subject. It was he vrho suggested the theory of lim ited liability. In the domain of torts, the application of the doctrine sic utere tuo ut alicnum non lacdas in Rylands i: Fletcher was due, in the first instance, to Bramwell, who differed from the other judges in the Exchequer. It is probable that he was at his best sitting with a special jury. There what has been aptly called the high initial velocity of his mind in mastering facts, assaying evi dence and applying general principles to particular facts came into full play. His insight into human nature was keen; he knew its weaknesses and its faults, and hum bug had no chance before him. The force of common sense and caustic humor could.

go no further than his admirable charges to juries. In a case where a farmer was charged with shooting at a boy who was stealing apples, after a lengthy argument by the counsel for the defendant, Bramwell charged the jury as follows: "Considering the materials he had, I am surprised, gentle men, that the learned counsel did not make his speech longer. I, however, shall leave the case to you in eight words: The .pris oner aimed at nothing and missed it." He had, moreover, rare skill in putting his view of a case before a jury without seeming to take a side. His highly original and independent mind contributed much to enliven the reports of his time. His clear and analytical intellect expressed itself in a vigorous and epigram matic style which is as rare in the reports as it is refreshing. Xo man appeared to think less of words and more of substance, yet few Englishmen have used their mother tongue with greater effect. His discussion in the case of the Commissioners of the In come Tax î'. Pemsel (1891), A. C. 531, as to what constitutes a charity, is a good example of his happy colloquialism. "I hold that the conversion of heathens and heathen nations to Christianity or any other religion is not a charitable purpose. That it is benevolent, I admit. The pro vider of funds for such a purpose doubtless thinks that the conversion will make the converts better and happier during this life, with a better hope hereafter. I dare say this donor did so. So did those who provided the faggots and racks which were used as instruments of conversion in times gone by. I am far from suggesting that the donor would have given funds for such a purpose as torture: but if the mere good intent make the purpose charitable, then I say the intent is the same in the one case as in the other. And I believe in all cases of propagandism there is mixed up a wish for the prevalence of those opinions we entertain, because they are ours. But what is a char