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which were too important for the ordinary courts but not of sufficient importance for the House of Lords. From this source sprang the Star Chamber and the Court of Requests as off-shoots. The first instance of the exercise of independent appellate juris diction by the Privy Council occurs in the reign of Elizabeth, when it took jurisdiction of an appeal from the Channel Islands. Coke calls the Council a board, not a court; and Hale, in treating systematically of all the existing jurisdictions, mentions it only in connection with its subservience to the House of Lords. By gradual encroachment, however, the Council built up a formidable jurisdiction. In the reign of Charles II it acquired jurisdiction of ecclesiastical and maritime appeals. Its judicial functions were placed upon a modern basis by the establishment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (3 and 4, Wm. IV, c. 41), with jurisdiction prin cipally over appeals from the colonies and in ecclesiastical and admiralty cases. Prior to this time the only Privy Council reports, aside from occasional decisions con tained in the early House of Lords reports, were those of Acton and Knapp. The former (1809-11) is made up mostly of brief opin ions in prize and colonial cases by Sir Wil liam Grant, who was during the early part of the century the dominant influence in the court. The reports of the court under its modern establishment begin with Knapp (1829-36), and the two series of his succes sor, Moore, overlap the official reports. For nearly two decades the labors of the Judicial Committee were borne mainly by

Parke and Brougham. Some of Brougham's most useful services were rendered in this court, and his encyclopedic mind and liberal views are displayed to best advantage in these reports. These two judges were to a great extent relieved by the accession in 1844 of Kingsdown, who served in this court for more than twenty years with great distinc tion. Kingsdown was one of the great judges of his time. Although a lawyer of vast and varied learning, his grasp of principle led him to deal but little with precedents. In the formulation of the opinions of the court, in which he bore the principal part, his refined taste and fastidious use of language make his opinions models of judicial expression. From 1854 he practically took charge of the appeals in prize cases, interpreting the law of blockade, capture and prize with marked liberality towards freedom of trade. His opinions in the cases of The Franciska, The Gerasimo, and Dyke r. Wolford, in the eighth volume of the State Trials, are good specimens of his style and method. His opinions in ecclesiastical cases were likewise characterized by breadth of mind. Among his most prominent cases of this kind are Gorham r. Bishop of Exeter, Liddell v. Weaterton, Long v. Bishop of Capetown, and the Essays and Reviews case.1 1 The following are among his ablest opinions in various branches of the law : Schacht ». Otter, 9 Moo. P. C. 150; Allen v. Macidock, II do. 438; Baltazzi v. Ryder, 12 do. 168; Kirchner i'. Venus, 12 ¿0.361; Secretary of State of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 13 do. 22; Bland v. Ross, 14 do. 210; Ward it. McCorkill, 15 do. 133; Attor ney General of Bengal v. Ranee Surnomoye Dossee, 2 Moo. P. C. (N. s.) 22; deary v. McAndrew, 2 do. 216; Brown 7'. Gugy, 2 do. 341; Austen v. Graham, I Spink357; The Otsee, 2 do. 170; The Julia, Lush. 224; The Hamburgh, Br. and Lush. 271.