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 John Marshall. and to which they adhered with respect and sometimes with reverence, the Chief Justice was forcible, logical and forever instructive. Xot to go into details, the trial of Aaron Burr is a classic, never equalled and not yet ap proached. The unerring self-control by which the presiding Judge mentally rose above the mists and miasma of popular ex citement, and the clearness of judgment which fastened upon the central fact of the case, were never more perfectly exhibited than in the trial of Colonel Burr, and upon that trial alone Marshall's reputation as a great Judge could safely rest.1 MARSHALL'S JUDICIAL STYLE.

Marshall's judicial opinions have qualities distinctively their own. They are among the most massive and original productions of the human intellect. Any one familiar with them instantly knows Marshall's style. It has been said that it was hard and dry and lacked fin ish. To this I cannot agree. Unornamented indeed his opinions are, and in all of his writ ings I recall only a single metaphor. But for strong, vigorous, masculine English, which expresses his meaning with the utmost clearness, precision and force, I do not know where his judicial style is excelled. His opin ions are characterized still more distinct ively by their matter than by their form. Though relating in many cases to questions on which parties warmly differed, how ut terly free they are from political bias! Story said : "When I examine a case I go from headland to headland; from case to case: Marshall has a compass, puts out to sea, and goes directly to his result." This is true. Marshall drew upon his own intellect ual resources, and his drafts were always honored. Tn the light of his own intelli gence, like another Columbus, he sailed, with dauntless courage, into new and unknown regions, guided only by the great principles of right, reason and justice, which he ap plied with equal caution, courage and wis11 fonorahle Nathaniel Shipman, United States Circuit Judge.

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dom in the practical work of construing the Constitution. His opinions are masterful ex amples of pure reasoning and logic and legal intuition. It has often seemed to me that he was endued in a wonderful measure with what the old theologians called "illuminating grace," enabling him to see the end from the beginning, and the bearing and effect of any principle or proposition, however artful or insidious, with a far-reaching sagacity that was never surpassed. His power of exposi tion in his opinions irresistibly carried con viction and compelled assent.1 Marshall's decisions are demonstrations founded upon pure reason. They are deduc tions, chains of compact reasoning, leading to inevitable conclusions. They are almost devoid of illustration of analogy. They show profound meditation and search after truth, and are remarkable for their deep penetra tion. They grapple with great underlying principles, and exclude extraneous circum stances. In the words of a contemporary: "When we regard their originality, their depth, their clearness and their adamantine strength, we look upon them as the highest efforts of the human mind."3 He had an intuitive perception of the real issue of every case, however complicated, and of the way in which it should be decided. His manner of reasoning was peculiarly judicial. It was simple, direct, clear, strong, earnest, logical, comprehensive, demon strative, starting from admitted premises, frankly meeting every difficulty, presenting the case in every possible aspect, and lead ing to philosophical and profoundly wise conclusions, sound in theory and practical in effect. He recognized that, next to a right decision, it was important that reasons for the decision should be fully stated so as to satisfy the parties and the public. And it may be said of him, as Charles Butler, in his Reminiscences, says of Lord Camden, 1 Honorable John F. Dillon.
 * Jutige Colt.