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 Origin and GroivtJi of Rights of Accused. Penn and his fellow prisoners demand their liberty, but instead are found guilty of con tempt of court because they have not uncov ered their heads in the presence of the court and are committed to prison for punishment. We are glad to know that both of the de fendants and all of the jurymen are subse quently released by order of a higher court without paying fines or suffering long im prisonment. This is the last recorded case in which the court attempts, by threats and intimidations, to force a jury to find such a verdict as the court desires. But prior to that time, the history of the courts is filled with instances in which the jury were coerced into a ver dict by means of fines, imprisonment or the want of food or other physical comforts and necessities. Another man prominent in the history of America, figured at an early date in one of the well known state trials, in the days when the defendants in such proceedings had few rights that any court felt bound to respect. Sir Walter Raleigh was charged with high treason, Coke was prosecuting officer, and the case claimed the attention of one of the highest courts of the realm. The evidence against the accused consisted almost entirely of the ex parte confession of one Cobham. Raleigh produced a letter from Cobham flatly contradicting the confession and asked that Cobham might be called as a witness to tes tify in open court. This request was re fused. The accused was without counsel; he was battling with one of the greatest lawyers of his time; he came from a close imprisonment that gave no opportunity to prepare his de fense; he had no means of procuring wit nesses, and no right to introduce evidence if he had procured the witnesses. Every in dignity was heaped upon him. The follow ing passage at arms will give some idea of the manner in which the trial was conducted : Coke (addressing Raleigh). " Thou art the most vile traitor that ever lived."

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Raleigh. " You speak indiscretely, barba rously and uncivilly." Coke. " I want words sufficient to express thy viperous treason." Raleigh. " I think you want words indeed, for you have spoken one thing half a dozen times." Coke. " Thou are an odorous fellow. Thy name is hateful to all the realm of England for thy pride." Raleigh. " It will go hard to prove a meas uring cast between you and me, Mr. Attor ney." Coke. " I will make it appear that there never lived a viler viper upon the face of the earth than thou." We are not surprised to know that Raleigh was convicted. A contemporary writer said : "To be accused of crime against the State, and to be convicted, are almost the same thing." In tracing the slow process by which the rights of accused persons gained recognition, we find that, from earliest times, persons ac cused of crime against the public have been proscribed. In Athens and in Rome and among the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans, all participation in public affairs was denied the accused. In the primitive courts of our forefathers, where we first find the jury, the giving of evidence was a public function like the holding of office. Indeed, the accused could not have given evidence, because of the fact that the same persons gave the evi dence and decided the cause. Those first jurors were chosen because they had knowledge of the facts in contro versy. With the slow evolution of the courts, the jurors became triers of fact alon&> while witnesses were called to give the evi dence. With this change in the organiza tion of the courts and in the method of try ing causes, the reason for the rule rendering the accused incompetent had been removed, but this old rule was tenaciously adhered to for centuries. In fact, we have but recently arrived at the stage where the old, arbitrary