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 The Southern Judiciary and Slavery. also; and, while the record does not state, let us hope that she was carried into Abra ham's bosom. Be this as it may, she made no disposition of the negroes, and the young widower began to console himself for the loss of a wife by the acquisition of a slave, and accordingly took possession of one of the slaves and was about to remove him South to sell him, when he was enjoined by a brother of the testator, who filed a bill to have the slave declared free. The court, delivering the opinion say: "The liberty which a testator intends to be stow is of so high a value to the objects of his benevolence — and must be supposed to so occupy his thoughts and so strongly to fix his purposes, that a devise of freedom is not to be defeated by any right of disposi tion (not exercised), which may be given to a devisee for life — and, if there is any doubt of the meaning of the will, the power of disposition must be construed to be sub ordinate to the higher and more important right of freedom."1 This opinion was quoted by Mr. Justice McLean in his dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case. It would naturally be expected that the act by which so valuable property as a slave should be given up by the master without consideration, would be attended by all the formalities possible and be evi denced by the most solemnly executed in struments, but the courts of Tennessee decided that no deed or writing was neces sary, but that acts in pais, from which free dom might be implied, were sufficient.2 And that, if a master said to his slave that he might go and be free, the slave at once became vested with a right to freedom, and that the master could not reassert his do minion over him.3 We can almost hear this court say, with Kmerson : — 1 Jacob z'. Sharp, Meigs, 114. - Abram v. Johnson, I Head, 120. 8 James v. State, 9 Hum., 311.

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"For what avails the plough or sail, Or land or life, if freedom fail?" The courts also made it the duty of the master to keep his slaves in decent apparel; and, if a slave was allowed to go about in public in garments " tattered and torn, and not sufficient to cover nakedness," the mas ter was indicted for lewdness, convicted and fined.4 The courts not only granted the slave all intendments in favor of freedom, but they exercised the greatest protecting care over him, and showed the utmost consideration for his welfare; not because he was valua ble property, but, as the opinions clearly show, because he was a human being, and entitled to consideration as such. In 1836, the husband of the owner of a life estate in slaves was preparing to remove them from the state, but was perpetually en joined from doing so; and the opinion of the supreme court shows how continually that court was working to throw about the slave all the protection afforded by a court of justice. "It is but recently," say the Court, " in this State, at least, that the peculiar nature and character of slave property, and of re lation between master and slave, have been regarded in our courts, in the spirit of a ra tional and humane philosophy. A few years ago, and any man who had a judgment debtor, might by virtue of an execution against him, become the owner of the slave of the third party, if he chose in a suit at common law, to pay the value or more than the value. A court of chancery, if the owner had there sought to restrain the bill, or recover the possession, closed its doors upon him, with the information given him, that he had a clear and unembarrassed rem edy at law. Afterwards, as it was discov ered, as wines, family pictures, plate, and ornamental trees, etc., were protected to the owner in a court of chancery against tres pass, so might a slave, if a family slave and
 * Brittain -,. State, 3 Hum., 203.