Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 11.pdf/614

 Constitutional Rights of Policy-Holders. all, and in that way the provision contained in the constitution could be completely ab rogated. . . . The court has no legislative authority, and no power to decline or re fuse the jurisdiction provided for it by the constitution. If it had it might impair and abridge its jurisdiction so far as to render the tribunal comparatively useless, which, the constitution has declared, shall be the most comprehensive in the State. Upon this subject, neither the court nor the legis lature has any power of election whatever. The court exists solely under the constitu tion, and while it does so it must be what that instrument has declared it shall be : a court of general jurisdiction in law and equity. And that includes the authority, as well as the duty, of hearing and deciding all actions of a legal or equitable nature; for the term, general, includes all." The same view of the question is taken by the court in the case of Mussen v. Ausable Granite Works (63 Hun. 3.67), where, in speaking of the supreme court, it is said : "Its jurisdiction is as wide as the boundaries of the State, and every person, natural or arti ficial, within its boundaries is subject to that jurisdiction." In defining jurisdiction, in the same case, the learned justice writing the opinion says : " The term jurisdiction, as used in the constitution, I think means juris diction of every kind that a court can possess, of the person, subject-matter, territorial, and generally the power of the court in the dis charge of its judicial duties." Again, it is said in the same case, citing many authorities, that " any act of the legislature which de prives the court of the jurisdiction it had at the time of the adoption of the constitution, or limits or qualifies it, is unconstitutional and void." In the case of People ex rel. Reynolds v. Common Council (140 N. Y., 300), following the same line of reasoning, it is laid down as a rule of law that the " obli gation of a contract is impaired, in the constitutional sense, by any law which pre vents its enforcement, or which materially

575

abridges the remedy for enforcing it which existed when it was contracted, and does not supply an alternative remedy equally ade quate and eff1cacious." At the time of mak ing the contract of insurance in the Swan case (supra) the constitution provided for a supreme court of general jurisdiction in law and equity; it gave the plaintiff the right to litigate any question growing out of the con tract, whether legal or equitable, and it was not within the power of the legislature to abridge that right by an enactment which denied the jurisdiction of the courts to issue judgments, orders and decrees in a particu lar class of cases. The enforcement of con tracts is purely a judicial function, and the legislature cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of the supreme court to prevent such a result. (See Flynn v. C. R. R. Co., 142 N. Y., 439; Alexander v. Bennet, 60 N. Y., 204; Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N.Y., 190; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 John., 508; People v. Coughtry, 58 Hun., 245; Matter of the Estate of Stillwell, 139 N. Y., 337; Popfinger v. Yutte, 102 N. Y., 38; The People v. Nichols, 79 N. Y.. 582; Huthoff v. Demorest, 103 N. Y., 377). In 1868 the State of Georgia enacted a new constitution, and sought a restoration of its rights under the provisions 01" the various acts of Congress. This new constitution, which was in force when the State was re admitted to its political duties and obliga tions, contained a provision that "no court or officer shall have, nor shall the general assembly give, jurisdiction to try, or give judgment on, or enforce any debt the con sideration of which was a slave or the hire thereof" (Art. 5, sec. 17). In the case of White v. Hart (13 Wallace, 646) the plain tiff had brought an action in the superior court of Chattanooga county to recover upon a promissory note $1,230. The defendant pleaded in abatement that the consideration of the note was a slave, and, on the plaintiff demurring, the court overruled the demurrer and gave judgment for the defendant, under