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parties happens to be a particular kind of insurance corporation? for section fifty-seven of the Insurance Law limits the operation of this so-called law to a particular class of in surance companies. The constitution makes no such distinction; it declares that " all corporations shall have the right to sue and shall be subject to be sued," not in the dis cretion of the legislature, but " in all courts in like cases as natural persons." The bill of rights found in the constitution of Massa chusetts gives the true intent of the first section of the constitution of New York, when it declares (Section XI) that " Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely and without being obliged to purchase it; completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws." This is but an assertion of the com mon law maxim that there is " no wrong without a remedy "; and, as was said in the case of Ashby v. White (2 Lord Raym. 953) " If a man has a right, he must have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a, remedy if he is injured in the exercise and enjoyment of it; and, indeed, it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal." Without taking time to consider the sug gestion that the legislature in changing the remedy must give the new remedy to the party in interest, and not make it depend upon the discretion of a public officer, we pass to the consideration of a provision of the constitution which, in conjunction with the provision already quoted, has not been considered by the courts in dealing with these contracts of insurance. Section I of Article VI says: "The supreme court is continued with general jurisdiction in law and equity," and the meaning of " general" is that which comprehends all, the whole

(Gracie v. Freeland, 1 N. Y., 228). In DeHart v. Hatch (3 Hun. 375) the leading case upon the question of the jurisdiction of the supreme court, Judge Daniels writing the opinion, it is said: "It (the constitu tion) provided that there should be a su preme court having general jurisdiction in law and equity. The terms used are so comprehensive that they include all cases of every description in law and equity, from the most important and complicated to the most simple and insignificant, and they im peratively and positively endow the court with that extended jurisdiction. The lan guage made use of is, that there shall be such a court, having the jurisdiction de clared; and that was given to it, not to be exercised or declined as the legislature might afterward provide or enact, or as that body and the court combined should at any time elect, but for the purpose of being at all times maintained and preserved for the benefit of those who might be parties to eon troversies in either law or equity. The juris diction conferred upon the court included both the power to entertain, progress, and, in the end, determine all civil actions, and the duty also to do those things; and for that reason, suitors in such cases have the right to require them to be done. The juris diction was eonferred for their benefit, and to secure and promote the stability and good order of the State. It was rendered perma nent and uniform in its nature, and as those attributes are provided for it by the fair im port of the constitution, it has not been left to the legislature either to abridge or limit them by any interposition on its part. For, if anything of that kind can be accomplished by legislation, then the jurisdiction can be by law abridged and reduced; and that would so far nullify the provision that there shall be such a court as the constitution has described, as such legislation might be made to extend. ... If the legislature can de clare that the court shall have no jurisdiction over one class of cases, it may do so as to