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 Constitutional Rights of Policy-Holders. person expressly authorized by statute, may sue, without joining with him the person for whose benefit the action is prosecuted," and the court in the case of People v. Lowe (117 N. Y., 175), which denied the right of the attorney-general to bring an equitable action in behalf of certain parties in interest in the settlement of a building and loan as sociation controversy, declares that it " is a general rule running through our whole sys tem of jurisprudence, that no person shall bring a suit, or even be a party to one, un less he has some interest therein;. . . the same rule, in reason certainly, applies to actions commenced by the people." In the case of the People v. Albany & Susquehanna Railroad Company (57 N. Y., 161,) it was said that " the people of this State have no general power to invoke the action of the courts of justice by suits in their name of sovereignty for the redress of civil wrongs sustained by some citizens at the hands of others. When they come into court as plaintiffs in a civil action they must come upon their own right for relief to which they themselves are entitled. It is not suff1cient for the people to show that wrong has been done to some one; the wrong must appear to be done to the people in order to support an action by the people for its redress." The court in the Lowe case (supra) pointed out that the attorney-general had no author ity under the provisions of sections 178 1, 1782, to bring an action in behalf of the people to vindicate private rights, and we find no such authority, either under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, or the insurance law; the latter simply denies to the courts the right to issue any judg ments, orders or decrees in reference to a certain character of actions, except upon the application of the attorney-general, etc. It nowhere makes it the duty of the attorneygeneral to act, section 1808 of the Code having reference to the action provided for in Articles II, III and IV of Title 2, and even in this section the action of the attorney-

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general depends upon his discretion. But this is of only incidental importance, and is referred to only because the learned court, in its opinion in the Swan case (supra) held that the statute did not impair the obliga tion of the contract because it furnished a remedy. The point to be noticed is that the Code of Civil Procedure (section 449) gives a right of action to the real party in interest, and section one of article I of the State constitution declares that "no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or de prived of any of the rights or privileges se cured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers." That the law of the land does not mean a statute enacted for the purpose of working the wrong is too well established to require any citation of authorities at this time, and the statute having recognized the right of a party in interest to maintain an action, by what right does the legislature step in and defeat the right by denying to the courts the power to enforce its judg ments? Let us get this point clearly in mind. In the Swan case, for example, the plaintiff was a member of- this State, guaranteed by the constitution all of the rights and privileges secured to any citizen thereof. Can there be any doubt that among the rights and privileges of a citizen of this State is the right to enter into a contract? Can there be any doubt that the defendant, the Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, was author ized by the law of its creation to enter into a contract with the plaintiff, in common with other persons? Having the right to make a contract, can there be any doubt that among the rights and privileges of citizens of this State is a right to enforce contracts according to their terms, and in the manner common to the jurisprudence of the State? How is the legislature to say that two parties, fully au thorized to make a contract, shall be denied admission to the courts for the purpose of enforcing the contract because one of the