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 Territorial Sovereignty. of the territorial governments. It may do for the Territories what the people under the Constitution of the United States may do for the States." ( National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S. 132.) "The power of Congress over the Terri tories of the United States is general and plenary, arising from and incidental to the right to acquire the Territory itself, and from the power given by the Constitution to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other property belonging to the United States. It would be absurd to hold that the United States has power to ac quire territory and no power to govern it when acquired. The power to make acqui sitions of territory by conquest, by treaty and by cession is an incident of national sov ereignty." (Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 42.) The first and the second of these decisions agree in one particular; and that is, that because no one of the States in the Union has any authority over the Territories, this authority must reside in the whole number of them combined under the Federal Gov ernment, which is assuming the very point in dispute. But it is difficult to perceive how all the States together possess power over people occupying the public domain which none of them possesses singly; and it would be as unreasonable to say that although no citizen of any nation alone has the right to enslave his neighbor, he and all the other citizens together have the right so to do. The first and the third decisions refer to the so-called property clause of the Consti tution; although in neither of them docs the court appear to think that it is sufficient to authorize Congress to legislate for the Territories; and in both, the court refers to the right to acquire territory, as the real source of power to govern its inhabitants after it has been acquired. If the property clause confers the power, there is no necessity for mentioning any other source

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of it. If, however, it does not, and if the right to acquire territory is the only source, the court agrees with the writer's conten tion, which is, that there is no constitutional authority for the legislation on this subject which Congress has heretofore enacted. The first decision asserts that the posses sion of the power is unquestioned; and the second asserts that its existence has always been conceded; whereas the truth is that it has always been questioned by some and denied by others. In the second decision no allusion is made to the property clause or to any other pro vision of the Constitution, which fact is an admission that the power in question if it exists at all does so outside and not inside the Constitution; and in that opinion the writer,concurs, although he denies that it exists anywhere. He admits that the Gov ernment owns and has the right to regu late the use of the land until it is sold to individuals; but he denies that it either owns, or has the right to govern, the people except by their consent. Although the court in several other decisions also asserts the unlimited authority of the Federal Gov ernment over the inhabitants of the Terri tories, it fails to prove that this authority is derived from the clauses of the Consti tution above quoted or from any others; and it also fails to show how the jurisdiction of the United States can be made to extend beyond its limits without the con currence and against the protests of the people sought to be brought under it. It is greatly to be desired that if this question should ever again be brought before that august tribunal, it will offer some more substantial reasons for its decision thereon than it has done heretofore; and, if it cannot do so, it would be displaying wisdom by admitting that its previous decisions are ut terly without foundation in law, in reason or in common sense. Although the Constitution does not for bid Congress to declare or to wage wars of