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That definition has been given to this word by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Gratiot et al., 14 Peters, 537, in which it says : — "The term 'territory,' as here used, is merely descriptive of one kind of property, and is equivalent to the word 'lands.'" If there be any doubt in regard to the mean ing of the word "territory," as here used, it must be entirely removed when the three following words, " or other property," are considered, as they clearly indicate that the word "territory" is intended to signify one species of property, and has no reference to people or to those political communities which are now called "Territories." It is true that the clause provides for " needful rules and regulations"; but these words cannot be properly construed to confer upon Congress the power of either civil or crim inal legislation for persons, as they apply only to " the territory or other property be longing to the United States "; and no one will seriously contend that the inhabitants of this portion of the public domain are property within the meaning of the clause under consideration, whatever else it may signify. Rules and regulations respecting property cannot include legislation for peo ple; and the only meaning which these words can have in respect to land is that Congress is authorized to provide for sur veying, improving, cultivating, or leasing it; and these rules and regulations can have force only while this territory belongs to the United States. Whenever it is sold it ceases to be property belonging to the United States; it becomes property belonging to individuals. It ceases to be public property; it becomes private property; and Congress when it sells this territory, parts with its juris diction over it. In support of this contention, the writer cites the following sentences from the unan imous opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Carroll v. Safford, 3 Howard, 460, 461. Referring to certain public land in

Michigan which had been purchased by the complainant, the court said. — "When the land was purchased and paid for, it was no longer the property of the United States, but of the purchaser. Lands which have been sold by the United States can in no sense be called the property of the United States." According to this decision, therefore, the jurisdiction of Congress over the public lands ceases when they are sold to indi viduals. But it docs not follow from this fact that the mere ownership of land by the Federal Government justifies Congress in assuming jurisdiction over the people who occupy it. It is well known that the United States owns large tracts of land within the boundaries of several States; but that fact does not deprive these States of their juris diction over the people who occupy this land, nor does it justify cither Congress or the Federal courts in assuming jurisdiction over them unless that has been expressly ceded to the Federal Government by the legislatures of these States. (Fort Leaven worth R. R. Co. 7'. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525.) And Congress possesses no more power over people occupying public land in the Territo ries than it does over people occupying public land in the States. So it is manifest that the provision of the Constitution above quoted does not confer upon Congress the power to establish governments over, or to legislate for, the people of the Territories without their consent. In further elucidation of the meaning of this clause, it may be remarked that if Congress should desire to sell any of the public buildings, ships of war, arms, ammu nition or other property of the Government, or to make rules and regulations for the use thereof, it has the power to do so under this provision, as the clause was incorporated into the Constitution for this purpose; but it is absurd to say that the power to dispose of property and to regulate its use includes the power to legislate for persons; as the