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"Where man and wife are acting together, on the same side of a question of property, they are under the temptation to do themselves more than justice. What is secured to the one is apt to be shared by the other. With respect to enjoyment, however it may be as to title, neither is a stranger to the other's fortune." — Booher v. Worrill, 57th Ga. 238. "The scheme of removal ordained by the act of Congress, is open and public. It is by peti tion. It contemplates a taking with leave, and not furtively by a sort of statutory larceny." — Carswell v. Schley, 59th Ga. 19. "For my own part, I think there are multi tudes of people who are trustworthy and reliable in all situations and under all circumstances. Declaim against the world as we may, it abounds in truth, purity and integrity. The law brands no witness as impeached just because he is not at peace with the scoundrel against whom he testifies." — Skipper v. State, 59th Ga. 65. "To be too drunk to form the intent to kill, he must be too drunk to form the intent to shoot." — Marshall v. State, 59th Ga. 156. "The brief of counsel asserts that the new trial was granted on Sunday. If it was, this ob jection should have been openly specified in the bill of exceptions, and not concealed under a generality that affords of it no hint whatever. We.cannot permit a judgment to be ambushed in this court in any such way." — Swindle v. Poore, 59th Ga. 338. "In this case, though it is involved in law and fact, and the facts were numerous and compli cated, the court acted as both judge and jury, the parties consenting to that mode of trial. The law and the facts are thus before us blended in one mass. In delivering his charge as judge silently to himself as jury, we know not what legal propositions the court laid down. We suppose we must give him the benefit of every presump tion on both branches of the case; and, so doing, we cannot pronounce with due legal certainty that he erred. We can suspect him of error, but cannot convict him. We held up the case from the last term, when it was argued, until the close of the present term, and used all reasonable diligence to discover the alleged errors. But the farthest advance we could make was into doubt. We entered that dim, misty atmosphere, and could neither go forward nor return. There we rest." — Gray v. Willingham, 59th Ga. 858.

"There is not much to dispute about, but perhaps equity can do more complete justice than could be done at law. As the chancellor wants to apply equitable principles rather than the ordinary rules of law let him have his way." Morris v. Barnwell, 60th Ga. 147. "A corporation of this state cannot be dis solved by an act of congress, or by the adminis tration thereof, through the federal courts. Georgia created, and she alone can destroy. Besides it is not the purpose of the bankrupt law to dissolve corporations. "Your money" not "your life," is the demand of the bankrupt act." — Holland v. Heyman, 60th Ga. 180. "The jury belonged to the vicinage, and could and did interpret the testimony in the light thrown upon it by the local gloss. They under stood what such a mode of living in Savannah meant; whether it meant concubinage or mar riage. We believe its ordinary meaning, through out Christendom, to be matrimony, and we are aware of no reason why it would or should be differently construed in Savannah." — Dillon?'. Dillon, 60th Ga. 206. "The writer of this opinion knows from per sonal experience that an invalid may be able to ramble among the mountains and fish a little for speckled trout, without being fit for business in the court-house. The other members of the court are weak in the faith, and seem loath to recognize a state of health so ambiguous." — Brumby v. Barnard, 60th Ga. 294. "The rind and pulp of an orange, or the en velope of a letter and the letter itself, are not much more closely connected than a passenger's trunk and its contents, when the trunk is in the care of the carrier, and the key in the passenger's pocket. . . . The traveler had almost as well be put in jail for an hour or two, as to have his trunk or valise locked up at the railroad station. Per haps he would rather go to jail for a little while if he could have the company of his baggage, than be free on condition of parting with it. To separate him from that which is the object of his chief care and solicitude through the whole course of his wanderings, is hard upon him indeed. Be tween passenger and baggage there is a relation beyond that of more ownership. When baggage is lost, it is not simply privation; it is bereave ment." — Western Railroad v. Thornton, 60th Ga. 301.