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The oath was one of opinion rather than as calumnia appears to have been an effluent serting facts. It was administered to both of an older and disused proceeding known as parties; the plaintiff swore that he had not the actio de calumnia, by which a successful brought his action in order to charge his ad defendant could sue for one tenth of the sum versary falsely, but because he believed he or value for which he had himself been sued, had a good instance (cause of action). The by way of recompense for having been im defendant swore that he did not make his de properly called before the court. The prac fence of evil intention, or for the purpose of tice of including a judgment for costs in baffling his adversary's claim, but because he every final decision probably had the same considered he was making use of just grounds original source. of defense. Each party was required to In several species of actions the unsuc swear that he neither had done nor would cessful litigant was liable to the penalties do anything for the purpose of defeating jus comprised under the general name of intice. The oath seems to have been a later famia. Thus infamia resulted from every development of the sponsiones, by which the condemnation in a publicum judicum, in parties on entering upon a litigation solemnly which any person not specially disqualified warned each other not to persevere unless he could be prosecutor. It resulted also from had a good and true cause of action, or of condemnation in actions of furturn, rapina, defense, as the case might be. It is perhaps injuria, de bonis, vi raptis, tutela, depositum, somewhat curious to find in the very modern and pro socio. Infamia, however, was more legislation of the Judicature Act the prin properly a penalty for the misconduct in ciple of the oath de calumnia reproduced in hering in the facts which constituted the the provisions for the verification of claims grounds of the actions to which it was and defenses by the oath of parties in certain affixed, than for rash litigation, although the cases. But, indeed, throughout that measure propounding of a defense in some cases had the Roman-Dutch system of pleading has the effect, if unsuccessful, of increasing the been largely drawn upon. penalty. Infamia did not as a rule result from an adverse judgment in actions upon An advocate of good faith was also ex contract. The actions of tutela, mandatum, acted from the advocates. Each was re quired to swear that he undertook the cause depositum, and pro socio were distinguished of his client with an upright mind, would be from ordinary actions upon contract, inas guilty of no false advocacy, would omit no much as although in all cases of proved proper work or research in the interest of delict there was involved some violation of good faith and just dealing, yet when delict his client, and finally, that should it after wards be found that he had with deceitful or occurred in these exceptional cases, it was malicious purpose misrepresented anything considered that there was also a peculiar in the cause, he would forthwith withdraw turpidity, from the violation thereby in from its advocacy. In course of time the volved of the obligations of friendship, out taking of the oath by the advocate in each of which the relation of tutors and the like must have arisen. There seem to open to particular cause was disused, being super seded by a general oath taken once for all us here glimpses of a fine standard of social upon being admitted to the office of carrying morality existing in these times. There on lawsuits for others. It was said by some were three conditions to the declaration of jurists that the oath ought to be renewed at infamia. One was that the judgment went stated periods, every fourth year; but this against the party in his own name, and not quaint arrangement does not appear to have in name of his procurator, curator, tutor, obtained generally in practice. The oath de or the like; hence a curious loophole for