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THE ANIMAL KINGDOM IN COURT. ''A/ine enemy 's dog — though he had bit me, should have stood that night against my fire.""

THOUGH human beings are the only creatures that the dignity of the courts will stoop to recognize as parties in litigation, the subject-matter of litigation is hampered by no such exclusive restriction, and men may bring the bone of contention into court and pick it there whether their dispute be concerning men or things or animals. It would not be easy to say which — men or things or animals — is directly responsible for the greatest amount of litigation, but if by common consent it is agreed that man himself is directly responsible for most, and indirectly of course, for all litigation, per haps the animal kingdom bears the palm next in order in direct responsibility. Of animals, though perhaps not the first in resources as a provoker of litigation, cer tainly the most interesting animal who trots into court is the dog. It is hard to state in so many words why we look upon the dog as our nearest in intelligence and sympa thies, yet it is certain that no animal ap proaches so near to human intelligence, the greatest element in man. There must be some merit in dogs not apparent in a ma terial sense, and not felt as a result of their service to mankind, for though of no actual use and in fact being the consumers of more food than would equal in value their service, when on rare occasions they are useful, yet the world over, man cherishes the dog and refuses to be without his company and com panionship. It follows that with the almost actual uselessness of the dog that it is not an earner or source of profit to man, and consequently the owners of dogs are gener ally defendants rather than the plaintiffs. But even with this as the usual and likely position of a dog-owner in court, yet a dog's master is not often a loser through his pro prietorship. As early as the year 17 10, in

the case of Mason vs. Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. p. 601, we find the court, through Lord Holt, saying that " the law takes notice that a dog is not of a fierce nature, but rather the contrary." And in this dictum we see the first foundation stones in the well-defined and settled outlines that the law upon the subject has assumed. Once it is established that the nature of the species is gentle and that every dog is a law-abiding and peace able Bruno, then it becomes necessary, before liability for the vulgar transgressions of a fierce Towser can be fastened on the owner, that he should have previous knowl edge of the unusual and not-to-be-expected feature. This is called scienter, and until an owner has this knowledge of his dog's viciousness he is not responsible, though in the error of its ways not acting as becomes a gentleman of the dog species, or a lady, as the case may be. To be more accurate and exact, once a dog has departed from the narrow path of recti tude and demeaned itself in ways other than should obtain with a strictly proper and gentle animal, and the owner knows of it, then it loses status and caste, and must be put down as a vicious animal, and the owner keeps it at his peril. Lord Coleridge, it seems, was anxious to reduce the law on the subject to a nicety in the way of succinct ness and brevity, and he succeeded by say ing that " Every dog is entitled to one bite," and the case has special reference to spring lamb or veal. The expression is varied by making it " Every dog is entitled to one worry." We can hardly find a fairer illus tration of the law than Beck vs. Dyson, 4 Camp. 198, decided in 1815. The ungallant and bad-mannered cur of Mr. Dyson, seized with some apparently uncontrollable and wicked impulse, sunk his sharp teeth