Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 10.pdf/26

 Style in Judicial Opinions. white race exclusively with the great natu ral rights which the Declaration of Inde pendence asserts. But this is not the place to vindicate their memory." Judge Curtis made the same near ap proach to perfection in his charges to the jury, as in his judicial opinions. What could be better, either in substance or in form, than his charge in the case of a prisoner accused of assault with a dangerous weap on : — "My instruction to you is this, — if the blow as struck, or as intended to be struck, by the defendant with this weapon, could put the life of the prosecutor in danger, then it was an assault with a dangerous weapon. It was such an assault, if a blow with it on the head would be dangerous to life, and the prisoner, being within striking distance, attempted to or did strike at the head of the prosecutor. But if a blow with this weapon upon the arm could not endan ger life, and the prisoner's only purpose and act were to strike the prosecutor's arm, then it was not an assault with a danger ous weapon." Mr. Justice Bradley, whose opinions are remarkably readable, was possessed not only of strong feelings, but of high spirit and fiery temper, and these qualities clearly show in the nervous strength, in the rapid march, and in the intensity of his judicial style; and yet he was a man of such fine training and selfdiscipline that he never gave way to extrava gance in language. Mr. Justice Grier, whose opinions also are extremely readable, did, perhaps, indulge sometimes in extravagant language. His character resembled that of Mr. Justice Bradley, but it was not so per fectly self-controlled. In the famous Good year rubber case, — a case argued before him at Trenton, by Daniel Webster on one side and Rufus Choate on the other, — he delivered an interesting opinion from which I make a short extract: "The testimony shows that many persons had made experi ments — that they had used sulphur, lead

and heat before Goodyear's patents, and probably before his discovery. But to what purpose? Their experiments ended in dis covering nothing, except, perhaps, that they had ruined themselves. . . . And yet, when genius and patient perseverance have at length succeeded, in spite of sneers and scoffs, in perfecting some valuable invention or discovery, how seldom is it followed by reward! Envy robs him of the honor, while speculators, swindlers and pirates rob him of the profits." Judge Hoar was possessed of extraordi nary wit, but, being a Northern man of Puritan descent, — unlike Judge Grier, who was a Southerner,— he carefully refrained from making witty observations in his judicial opinions. There is, however, in some of them a slight trace of grim humor, giving additional point to his clear, terse and cleancut style. Thus in one case, he said : — "The instruction that the presumption of a partnership from the use of a name such as is commonly used where a partnership exists, was a slight one and easily rebutted, seems to us. . . not subject to exception. The presumption that an expression means some thing when it cannot be shown what it means, or that it means anything, is a slight presumption." In delivering an opinion in a breach of promise case, he remarked : "The promise to marry not being often made in the presence of witnesses, or in writing, has usually, in cases of this nature, been proved by circumstantial evidence." From the fact that style is the reflex of the man, it follows that in every good style there must be a distinct personal element; and I believe that this is just as true of judicial opinions as of other writings. As a rule opinions rendered by single judges are superior in style to those rendered by a bench of judges, speaking through the mouth of a single judge. This is one rea son why the reports of decisions by the in ferior Federal courts make much better reading than the reports of the State court