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Law of Injunctions," " courts of equity will not interfere for the punishment or preven tion of merely criminal or immoral acts, un connected with violations of private right. Equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the commission of crimes, or to enforce moral obligations and the performance of moral duties, nor will it interfere to prevent an illegal act merely because it is illegal. And, in the absence of any injury to private rights, it will not lend its aid by injunction to re strain the violation of public or penal statutes or the commission of immoral or illegal acts." "If a charge be of a criminal nature, or an offense against the public, and does not touch the enjoyment of property," says Chancellor Kent in the case of the AttorneyGeneral v. Utica Insurance Company (2 Johns. Ch. 371 ) " it ought not to be brought within the direct jurisdiction of this court, which was intended to deal only in matters of civil right, resting in equity, or where the remedy at law was not sufficiently adequate. Nor should the process of injunction be ap plied, but with the utmost caution. It is the strong arm of the court, and to render its operation benign and useful it must be exercised with great discretion, and when necessity requires it. ... Thus, in Brown's case, in 2 Vesey,4i4," continues the learned chancellor, " a motion was made for an in junction to stay the use of a market, and Lord Hardwicke said it was a most extraordi nary attempt, and that the plaintiff had several remedies which he might use. He said it would cause great confusion to bring into contempt, upon the injunction, all per sons who might use the market; and that if the court ought to interfere at all, it would be after the title was established at law." Quoting Lord Eldon (Attorney General v. Nichol, 16 Vesey, 338) on an information filed to restrain the defendant from obstruct ing the ancient lights of a hospital, the chancellor says: " I know that the court is in the practice of restraining private nuisances

to property, and of quieting persons in the enjoyment of private rights; but it is an ex tremely rare case, and may be considered, if it ever happened, as an anomaly for a court of equity to interfere at all, and much less primarily, by injunction, to put down a public nuisance which did not violate the rights of property, but only contravened the general policy. The plain state of the' case, then, is that an information is here filed by the attorney-general, to redress, and to re strain, by injunction, the usurpation of a franchise, which, if true, amounts to a breach of law, and of public policy. I may venture to say that such a prosecution is without precedent in this court, but it is supported by a thousand precedents in the courts of law. How, then, can I hesitate on the question of jurisdiction? The whole question, upon the merits, is one of law, and not of equity. The charge is too much of the nature of a misdemeanor to belong to this court. The process of injunction is too peremptory and powerful in its effects to be used in such a case as this, without the clearest sanction. I shall better consult the stability and utility of the powers of this court by not stretching therii beyond the limits prescribed by the precedents." "The jurisdiction of these courts, thus operating by way of special injunctions," says Mr. Justice Story in his " Equity Juris prudence" (vol. 2, page 291 ), "is manifestly indispensable for the purposes of social jus tice in a great variety of cases, and therefore should be fostered and upheld by a steady confidence. At the same time it must be admitted that the exercise of it is attended with no small danger, bo! h from its summary nature and its liability to abuse. It ought, therefore, to be guarded with extreme caution, and applied only in very clear cases; otherwise, instead of becoming an in strument to promote the public, as well as private, welfare, it may become a means of extensive, and, perhaps, of irreparable in justice."