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 Style in Judicial Opinions. should err in my judgment, there is a judicature, equal in dignity to a Roman senate, that will cor rect it." In the same volume of the Supreme Court reports, from which I have taken the worst of the specimens just exhibited, there is a passage which might serve as a model of dignity and purity in judicial style. It occurs in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harían in that important case where the Court upheld a statute of Louis iana compelling railroad companies to pro vide separate cars for white and colored passengers, and prohibiting passengers of either race from riding in the cars set apart for the other. Mr. Justice Harían held that the statute was unconstitutional. He said : — "The white race deems itself to be the dom inant race in this country. And so it is in pres tige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of con stitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitu tion, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens, there is no caste here. Our Constitution is color blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. ... It is there fore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race." This passage will doubtless be remem bered long and quoted often, — but if the same ideas, which are not in themselves new or striking, had been expressed in language devoid of style, no one would think them worthy of particular attention. Another finished example of dignity and simplicity in style will be found in the clos ing passage of the dissenting opinion deliv ered by Mr. Justice Curtis in the Dred Scott case. He said : — "I have expressed my opinion and the reasons

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therefor at far greater length than I could have wished, upon the different questions on which I have found it necessary to pass, to arrive at a judgment in the case at bar. These questions are numerous, and the grave importance of some of them required me to exhibit fully the grounds of my opinion. I have touched no question which, in the view I have taken, it was not abso lutely necessary for me to pass upen, to ascertain whether the judgment of the circuit court should stand or be reversed. I have avoided no ques tion on which the validity of that judgment de pends. To have done either more or less would have been inconsistent with my views of my duty." This passage — and indeed everything that Judge Curtis wrote — reflected the singular simplicity and . directness of his character. He was essentially a lawyer, and to say that is of course to admit that his character had marked limitations. It would hardly have been possible for Judge Curtis to recognize the validity of a " higher law "; he would have abided by the law of the land, even though that law operated unjustly — at least it is difficult to conceive of his doing otherwise. But in so doing he would have followed his conscience, and he would have followed it with such perfect simplicity and sincerity as not to ad mit the least trace of bravado, of affectation, of boasting, of vanity, even of self-conscious ness. It was well said of him, by Mr. Elias Merwin, at the meeting of the bar held after the death of Judge Curtis : " The wonderful precision and accuracy of his mental opera tion, I cannot but believe, were due in a large measure to the singular rectitude and force of his character." Thus far, in giving specimens of bad judicial style, I have quoted only from our most august tribunal. Doubtless, if one were to ransack the opinions of the various State courts, he could find man}- examples of inelegance and incorrectness. I remember one opinion, rendered by a Western court, in which the learned judge declared: "Courts are not required to hypothecate instruc